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FIGHTING THE RESOURCE CURSE: THE RIGHTS OF 
CITIZENS OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 
Leif Wenar & Jérémie Gilbert* 
ABSTRACT—Respect for the rights of peoples over natural resources is 
crucial for the flourishing of communities and states. This article confirms 
that international law ascribes robust resource rights both to indigenous 
peoples and to citizens of independent states. These resource rights include 
indigenous peoples’ right to free, prior, and informed consent and citizens’ 
rights that resource revenues are never used corruptly but are used first to 
secure their means of subsistence. Resource rights are human rights, respect 
for which requires substantial reforms in the practices of corporations and 
investors as well as in the laws of resource-importing and resource-exporting 
states. 
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Improving humanity’s use of Earth’s natural resources must be a top 
international priority. Today’s climate crisis is one reason. Another is that, 
in many countries, resources benefit the few at the expense of the many. 
Absent accountability to the people of a territory, a rich natural resource 
endowment can be a curse. Most authoritarian regimes today are in resource-
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rich states.1 Most highly corrupt regimes are in resource-rich states.2 Most 
civil wars today are in resource-rich states,3 most of the worst hunger crises 
are in these states,4 and most refugees today are fleeing from these states.5 
And, strikingly, most of the world’s severe poverty will soon be in resource-
rich states.6 
While these are only correlations, the preponderance of social scientific 
research supports causal connections.7 For example, in the developing world, 
oil states are fifty percent more likely than non-oil states to be ruled by 
authoritarian regimes, and twice as likely to suffer armed civil conflict.8 
Moreover, in contrast to states that are not primary producers, the major oil 
states outside the West have gone decades becoming no richer, freer, or more 
peaceful than they were in 1980.9 
Vast revenues are flowing into resource-exporting states, in the Middle 
East, the former Soviet Union, Africa, and the Americas. Crude oil exports 
alone were worth an enormous $1.1 trillion in 2019.10 Yet, where these 
revenues are controlled by elites and armed groups, they fuel further 
oppression, corruption, strife, and suffering. In Angola, for example, 
 
 1 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE COMMODITIES ROLLER COASTER: A FISCAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR UNCERTAIN TIMES 21 (2015); See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 18-19 
(2021) (displaying “authoritarian regimes” as “Not Free” states). 
 2 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019 3 (2020), 
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/results/table (displaying “corrupt regimes” as states with 
corruption scores of 20 or below). 
 3 See UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM, 
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/downloads (lasted visited Jan 2, 2021) (showing civil conflicts that had over 1000 
violent deaths in 2016-19). 
 4 See FOOD SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK, GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES 21 (2020) 
https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000114546/download/ (listing the 10 worst food crises in 
2019). 
 5 See Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Origin, THE WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sm.pop.refg.or?year_high_desc=true (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) 
(providing the top eight refugee source countries in 2018). 
 6 See Share of the World’s Poor Living in Resource-Rich Countries May Peak at 75% in 2030, 
BUSINESS A.M. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.businessamlive.com/share-of-the-worlds-poor-living-in-
resource-rich-countries-may-peak-75-in-2030/ (predicting that most of the world’s severe poverty will be 
in resource-rich states). 
 7 Wilson Prichard, Paola Salardi, & Paul Segal, Taxation, Non-Tax Revenue and Democracy: New 
Evidence Using New Cross-Country Data, 109 WORLD DEV. 295 (2018); David Wiens, Paul Poast, & 
William Roberts Clark, The Political Resource Curse: An Empirical Re-evaluation, 67 POL. RES. Q. 783 
(2014); Michael Ross, What Have We Learned About the Resource Curse? 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 239 
(2015). 
 8 MICHAEL ROSS, THE OIL CURSE: HOW PETROLEUM WEALTH SHAPES THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
NATIONS 1 (2012). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Daniel Workman, Crude Oil Exports by Country, WORLD’S TOP EXPORTS (Jan. 3, 2020), 
http://www.worldstopexports.com/worlds-top-oil-exports-country/. 
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resource revenues sustained the power and wealth of corrupt state officials 
while the children of the country died of poverty at the highest rate in the 
world.11 In Azerbaijan, an unaccountable government has used resource 
revenues for years forcefully to suppress protests of its policies.12 The oil-
funded militants of ISIS and the mineral-funded militants in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo have shown how non-state actors who sell off resources 
can pay for the recruits and weapons needed to start or sustain civil conflict.13 
The root problem in such cases, we argue, is that resources are exported 
without accountability to the citizens of the state. Violations of 
accountability are not only bad in themselves—they enable further violations 
as state (and sometimes non-state) actors become empowered by resource 
revenues to escape accountability in the future, often leading to further 
human rights violations as well.14 By contrast, in states where citizens can 
hold the state accountable for natural resource management, the risks of these 
pathologies are substantially reduced.15 Accountable yet highly resource-
dependent states, such as Norway with its oil and Botswana with its 
diamonds, do not suffer the resource curse (indeed, they lead their regions in 
peace and prosperity).16 Accountability to citizens for resource management 
is crucial for the flourishing of individuals, communities, and whole regions 
of the earth.17 
International law can lead in lifting the resource curse. Under 
international human rights law, citizens have fundamental rights over the 
resources of their territory.18 This is firmly expressed in common Article 1 
 
 11 See RICARDO SOARES DE OLIVEIRA, MAGNIFICENT AND BEGGAR LAND: ANGOLA SINCE THE 
CIVIL WAR 25-200 (2015); UNICEF, LEVELS & TRENDS IN CHILD MORTALITY 18-27 (2015). 
 12 See Azerbaijan Events of 2020, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2021), https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2021/country-chapters/azerbaijan. 
 13 See LEIF WENAR, BLOOD OIL: TYRANTS, VIOLENCE, AND THE RULES THAT RUN THE WORLD 48-
64 (2017). 
 14 Id. at 17-47. 
 15 Id. at 14-20. 
 16 Id. at 11-16. (This article concerns the “political resource curses” of repression, corruption, and 
conflict; there is also the macroeconomic phenomenon of slower growth in resource-rich states, not 
discussed here, that is also called a “resource curse”). 
 17 AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS [ACHPR], State Reporting Guidelines 
and Principles on Articles 21 and 24 of the African Charter Relating to Extractive Industries, Human 
Rights and the Environment, ¶ 11 (May 22, 2017) (The African Commission defines “natural resources” 
and “wealth” as referring respectively to “a people’s tangible and intangible possessions having socio-
economic value and to both the non-renewable resources including oil, gas and minerals and renewable 
resources including surface and groundwater, wind, fauna and flora. Natural resources thus encompass 
all assets or materials that constitute the natural capital of a nation.”); See Ramez Abubakr Badeeb, Hooi 
Lean, & Jeremy Clark, The Evolution of the Natural Resource Curse Thesis: A Critical Literature Survey, 
51 RESOURCES POL’Y 123 (2017). 
 18 JÉRÉMIE GILBERT, NATURAL RESOURCES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN APPRAISAL (2019). 
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of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
which states that: 
 
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth 





Moreover, both of the Covenants also reaffirm this right in their last 
substantive article: 
 
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the 





Significantly, this is the only human right that is stated twice in the two 
Covenants; no other Covenant right is reemphasized in this way. The 
Covenants are, in turn, accepted by the preponderance of states. Ninety-eight 
percent of the world’s population lives in a state that is party to at least one 
of these treaties.21 
Despite their prominence in the Covenants, the rights of peoples over 
natural resources are neglected rights and the subjects of widespread 
misunderstandings.22 For example, it is sometimes said that states are (or can 
be) the only holders of rights over resources. Or it is said that states always 
act in the interest of the people, whatever states may do with the territory’s 
resources. Or it is said that popular ownership of resources requires “resource 
nationalism” or that it forbids privatization. Such claims fail to register the 
many developments in the international law of natural resources since World 
War II. This article will show that international law regarding natural 
 
 19 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1 (Dec. 16, 
1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, art. 1 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]. Together referred to as the “Covenants”. 
 20 ICCPR, supra note 19, at art. 47; ICESCR, supra note 19, at art. 25. 
 21 Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR 
HUM. RTS., http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2020); Total Population by Country 2020, 
WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2020). 
These sets of data show that out of the 169 member states of the United Nations, more than six out of 
seven states are party to at least one of the Covenants, including all of the states in the Americas, Europe, 
and Africa (except South Sudan and some small islands) and nearly every state in Asia, including China 
and India. Excluding states with populations of less than a million finds that 95 percent of states are party 
to one of the Covenants. 
 22 Wenar, supra note 13, at 208-19; Jérémie Gilbert, The Right to Freely Dispose of Natural 
Resources: Utopia or Forgotten Right? 31 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 314, 341 (2013). 
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resources has evolved dramatically since 1945, ascribing ever more specific 
and substantive rights to citizens. 
This article first surveys the historical development of peoples’ rights 
over resources in international law, highlighting the progress that has been 
made across several domains. The article then explores how these rights can 
be used to fight the resource curse, by securing for citizens powers of 
accountability over their natural wealth. 
Part I begins the historical study with the era of decolonization in the 
1950s and 1960s, when national populations came to be recognized as having 
rights against the exploitation of resources by foreign states. Part II explores 
the 1990s and 2000s, when indigenous peoples gained significant rights to 
resources within their ancestral territories and moved the debate from 
theoretical issues to the practical specification of natural resource rights. Part 
III then traces the evolution of the ascription of natural resource rights to all 
the citizens of a state, which solidified the idea that the resources of the state 
are the “birthright” of its population. 
Building on this historical survey, Part IV analyzes the content of the 
rights of citizens over natural resources, detailing the substantive, 
procedural, and remedial dimensions of these rights. Part V then envisages a 
world where the resource rights of peoples are respected. The focus here is 
not only on reforms in resource-cursed states, but also on reforms in states 
whose corporations operate in resource-cursed states (“corporate-home 
states”) and in states that import resources from those states. The aim of these 
reforms is for corporate-home states and resource-importing states to reduce 
their contributions to the violation of the human rights of peoples in resource-
cursed states, and to do so without running afoul of the principle of non-
intervention in the affairs of other states.23 Indeed, corporate-home and 
resource-importing states should believe that they are required to make such 
reforms out of respect for human rights and the self-determination of 
peoples.24 
These reforms are required because the domestic legal default of every 
state today is to allow its corporations to make deals with unaccountable 
actors to exploit foreign resources, and to import resources that have been 
extracted with no accountability to the people of the state of origin.25 These 
 
 23 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 4, 7; G.A. Res. 2131A (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention and Interference the Domestic Affairs of States (Dec. 21, 1965); G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 24 ICCPR, supra note 19, at Pmbl. (declaring an obligation of states under the UN Charter to promote 
respect for and observance of human rights, including the self-determination of peoples). 
 25 See Leif Wenar, Coercion in Cross-Border Property Rights, 32 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 171 (2015). 
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legal defaults drive the resource curse, as they send substantial (and 
sometimes massive) revenues to authoritarian regimes, corrupt officials, and 
armed groups, empowering them to escape accountability further. 
Yet since human rights and self-determination require resource 
management to be at least minimally accountable to citizens, these legal 
defaults violate primary norms of international law. Indeed, if we take 
seriously the Covenants’ propertarian language that each state’s resources 
belong to its people, then these legal defaults authorize commercial dealings 
with foreign actors who are entirely unaccountable to the owners of the 
resources. That is, every state today is authorizing commercial deals for 
goods stolen from their owners, the people. Using one established metric for 
accountable governance finds that over fifty percent of the world’s traded 
oil, worth hundreds of billions of dollars every year, should be considered to 
be stolen goods.26 
Human rights and self-determination require states to reform their 
domestic laws to prohibit their corporations and importers from making 
resource deals with foreign actors who are entirely unaccountable to their 
citizens. Such reforms would require significant changes in transnational 
practices regarding the extraction of and trade in natural resources. We 
examine the challenges to responsible unilateral and multilateral adoption of 
these reforms, drawing on historical parallels such as the strengthening of 
transnational anti-corruption laws. We also touch on potential impacts of 
reforms in related areas of transnational law, such as corporate regulation 
and investor-state relations. 
In all, this article will argue that an historical analysis of the 
international law on peoples’ rights to natural resources supports the 
ascription of robust rights over natural resources to the citizens of 
independent states. The neglect of these fundamental rights creates a vicious 
cycle that reinforces the resource curse; legal recognition for these rights is 
vital for the lives of millions around the world today. 
I. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES OVER NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
As the passages from the human rights Covenants show, peoples hold 
rights over natural resources as part of their right to self-determination. Yet 
this raises a special interpretive challenge, because international law also 
recognizes the rights of states over natural resources. Sovereignty over 
natural resources is traditionally one of the attributes of state sovereignty, 
 
 26 FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 1; Workman, supra note 10. Using the Freedom House “Not Free” 
category as a measure of non-accountable governance, cross-referenced with the top 15 crude oil 
exporting states. 
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and the assumption under general international law is that state sovereignty 
entails jurisdictional rights over resources within the territory.27 This dual 
ascription of rights has been clarified and regimented through the historical 
development of international law of natural resources, along several 
dimensions. 
A. Drafting History: From Decolonization to the New Economic Order 
The dynamic between peoples’ and states’ rights over resources first 
became vivid in 1952, when the UN General Assembly included in the draft 
Covenants two paragraphs on the rights of peoples to political and economic 
self-determination.28 International law regarding natural resources then 
became partially bifurcated. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
was primarily understood as an external right of state self-determination: a 
right of a state vis-à-vis other states.29 This external right was emphasized in 
many treaties and declarations, particularly in the post-colonial context 
where inequitable contracts with foreign investors and the nationalization of 
resources were significant issues.30 
However, UN General Assembly Resolutions also continued to affirm 
peoples’ internal rights of self-determination: the rights of peoples against 
their own state. For example, in these resolutions peoples have often been 
ascribed a right to benefit from their country’s natural resources.31 Nico 
Schrijver suggests that this reflected the desire of many states to link self-
determination to the realization of socio-economic rights during the human 
rights codification process of the 1950s and 1960s.32 
The separation of peoples’ and states’ rights can be seen in several UN 
General Assembly resolutions that recognized permanent sovereignty as a 
right of peoples as well as states. For example, Article 1 of the 1962 General 
 
 27 See NICO SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND 
DUTIES 48-50 (2007). State sovereignty over natural resources is limited by several duties, such as a duty 
to take due care of the environment and a duty to settle transborder resource issues equitably. 
 28 G.A. Res. 54/5 (VI), Inclusion in the International Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights of 
Article Relating to the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination (Feb. 5, 1952); see id. at 49-53. Chile 
attempted to add a third paragraph that stated, “The right of peoples to self-determination shall also 
include permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources.” Yet this formulation was 
ultimately rejected, in part because the notion of sovereignty was deemed not applicable to peoples. 
 29 Wenar, supra note 13, at 174-89. 
 30 Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural Resource Allocation: 
Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-Based Development, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 785, 796-
97 (2012). 
 31 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, art. 1 (Dec. 14, 1962); 
G.A. Res. 2158 (XXI), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, art. 5 (Nov. 25, 1966); G.A. Res. 
2692 (XXV), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of Developing Countries and Expansion of 
Domestic Sources of Accumulation for Economic Development, art. 2 (Dec. 11, 1970). 
 32 Schrijver, supra note 27, at 295. 
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Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
asserts that, “[t]he right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over 
their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interests of their 
national development and of the well-being of the people of the State 
concerned.”33 
Concurrently, the human rights Covenants were being drafted in the 
General Assembly. After long debates, the two articles quoted above—
common Article 1(2) of the ICCPR and ICESCR and the identical articles 
47 of the ICCPR and 25 of the ICESCR—affirmed and then reaffirmed the 
human rights of peoples over their natural resources.34 The Covenants were 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1966, and came into force in 1976 after 
the deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or accession.35 
It is worth noting that through the early 1970s there were several 
General Assembly resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources that did not refer to the rights of peoples. For example, the 1972 
Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of 
Developing Countries reaffirmed the right of states to permanent sovereignty 
but focused only on the right of states to be free from outside coercion.36 
Similarly, the 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order made no mention of the rights of peoples, again focusing 
only upon states’ rights to sovereignty over natural resources as against other 
states.37 
Some have taken this pause in the 1970s to imply that the rights of 
peoples are extinguished after the end of colonial rule. And it is correct that 
the term “peoples” in international instruments can, and in the past often did, 
refer to peoples under colonial occupation or trusteeship.38 For example, in 
 
 33 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), supra note 31, art. 1 (This phrasing was reaffirmed only once in G.A. Res. 
2692 (XXV), supra note 31, art. 2); G.A. Res. 2158 (XXI), supra note 31, art. 5 (Several further 
resolutions dealing with permanent sovereignty do raise specific concerns for peoples as distinct from 
states: for example, Article 5 of the 1966 General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources requires states to take due regard of the development needs and objectives of the 
people when engaging with foreign enterprises.) 
 34 ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 1(2), 47; ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 1(2), 25. 
 35 ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 49; ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 27. 
 36 G.A. Res. 3016 (XXVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources of Developing 
Countries, art. 1-2 (Dec. 18, 1972). 
 37 G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 
(May 1, 1974). 
 38 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 
21) (in 1971 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirmed the sovereignty of the Namibian people over 
its natural resources against the mandatory administration of South Africa); G.A. Res. 2145 (XXI), 
Question of South West Africa (Oct. 27, 1966). A UN Special Committee called Namibia’s natural 
resources “the birthright of the Namibian people.” G.A. Res. 34/92, infra note 138. 
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1989 the ICJ affirmed the importance of the right of the Nauruan people to 
sovereignty over their natural resources before their independence from 
Australia.39 Yet an “only colonial” interpretation of the rights of peoples has 
been consistently rejected by authoritative sources. 
For example, upon becoming parties to the ICESCR, both India and 
Bangladesh attempted to limit the meaning of “peoples” in Article 1 to 
peoples under some form of foreign domination. Yet their reservations were 
firmly rejected by other state parties.40 Furthermore, the UN Human Rights 
Committee (hereinafter HRC) has confirmed that Article 1 in the ICCPR 
does not apply only to peoples living under foreign domination.41 As Rosalyn 
Higgins writes, “[T]he idea has been consistently fostered by the Committee 
on Human Rights, acting under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
that self-determination is of continuing applicability; and the idea has 
undoubtedly taken a general hold.”42 
The rights of peoples to internal self-determination are not “only 
colonial.” Indeed, as we will see, these rights continued to develop and 
solidify after the lull in the early 1970s. 
 
 39 Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Judgement, 1992 I.C.J. 
(June 26); Case T‑512/12, Front Polisario v. Council, 2015 E.C.R. ¶¶ 207-08, 223-47 (in 2015 the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) annulled the part of a trade agreement between the European Union and 
Morocco that pertained to Western Sahara, citing among other grounds a letter from the UN Legal 
Counsel affirming permanent sovereignty over natural resources of the peoples of non-self-governing 
territories). 
 40 ICESCR, Declarations and Reservations, Objections (Dec. 16, 1966), https://treaties.un.org/doc/ 
Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-3.en.pdf. India’s declaration was that the right of 
self-determination applies “only to the peoples under foreign domination,” and that the words referring 
to the right “do not apply to sovereign independent States or to a section of a people or nation - which is 
the essence of national integrity.” Bangladesh’s declaration was that Article 1 is understood as applying 
in “the historical context of colonial rule, administration, foreign domination, occupation and similar 
situations.” Yet France’s objection was that India’s reservation “attaches conditions not provided for by 
the Charter of the United Nations to the exercise of the right of self-determination.” Germany said that, 
“Germany strongly objects . . . to the declaration made by the Republic of India in respect of Article 1 . . . 
The right of self-determination . . . applies to all peoples and not only to those under foreign domination.” 
Pakistan made a similar statement. Though the reservations are still registered, these strong objections to 
attempts at narrowing the scope of the right show that many states understand the right as applying more 
broadly than only to peoples under colonial occupation. 
 41 HRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: 
Comments of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.38 (Aug. 3, 1994) (in 1994 
the HRC criticized Azerbaijan’s narrow view of self-determination and declared that “under Article 1 of 
the Covenant, that principle applies to all peoples, and not merely colonized peoples.”). 
 42 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 116-
17 (1994) (“The Committee on Human Rights, when examining the report of a state party to the Covenant, 
asks not only about any dependent territories that such a state party may be responsible for (external self-
determination) but also about the opportunities that its own population has to determine its own political 
and economic system (internal self-determination). Virtually no states refuse to respond to probing 
comments and questions on internal self-determination, and the Committee is not told that no such right 
exists. Rather, it is accepted that the right exists.”). 
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B. Peoples as Holding and Exercising Rights 
Before proceeding with the historical development of peoples’ rights, a 
conceptual point that has puzzled many can be clarified. The proposition that 
the human rights Covenants grant rights to peoples rests on the assumption 
that peoples and states have separate legal personalities. Given the wording 
of the Covenants and other international instruments, this is a plausible 
proposition. Moreover, since all human rights are, in the first instance, rights 
against the state, the Covenants appear to be asserting that peoples’ rights 
over natural resources constrain the discretion of states in the management 
of natural resources, putting limits on what a state may do in the name of 
those who reside in its territory. 
Historically, the proposition that peoples and states have separate legal 
personalities has sometimes been denied.43 Moreover, even when the legal 
personalities of peoples and states have been distinguished conceptually, it 
was sometimes claimed that peoples either cannot hold or cannot exercise 
rights independently of their state.44 
This conceptual point is now settled: international law now affirms 
decisively that peoples can hold and exercise rights independently of their 
state. First, territorially defined groups can hold and exercise territorial 
rights. For instance, a state may not legally transfer territory to another state 
without the consent of the population of that territory, and the peoples of 
independent territories such as Puerto Rico have an ongoing right to choose 
their terms of association with the larger state.45 None of these rights can be 
held by or exercised by the state in question, but only by the people. 
Second, citizens are also capable of exercising rights independently of 
their state through the exercise of rights to participate in government. Article 
21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 25 of the 
ICCPR both provide for the participation of every citizen in public affairs, 
including the right to vote.46 Citizens’ collective rights to internal self-
 
 43 For instance, Hans Kelsen said of the U.N. Charter’s ascription of “equal rights and self-
determination of peoples” that the word “‘peoples’ . . . means probably ‘states,’ since only states have 
‘equal rights’ according to general international law . . . so ‘self-determination of peoples’ . . . can mean 
only ‘sovereignty of states.’” HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 52 (1950). 
 44 See Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
and the Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE 
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (VOLUME 137) 419, 562-65 (1974). 
 45 The citizens in the territory must give their explicit consent to any territorial transfer, ideally 
through a referendum. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL 
REAPPRAISAL 132-33, 189-90 (1995); See Higgins, supra note 42, at 119-20 (discussing independent 
territories). 
 46 G.A. Res. 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
UDHR]; ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 25; Higgins, supra note 42, at 120-21 (Higgins explains the link in 
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determination, including their right freely to dispose of natural resources, are 
exercised independently of the state, as citizens exercise their individual 
political rights.47 
In sum, as Antonio Cassese says about the Covenants, “[t]o hold that 
peoples as such are not entitled to any legal claim proper means to gloss over 
the significance of the step taken in 1966 by member states of the UN when 
adopting Article 1—a step designed to upgrade peoples to the status of co-
actors in the world community, of participants in at least some international 
dealings.”48 
II. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND NATURAL RESOURCES: FROM THEORY TO 
PRACTICE  
From the 1970s onward, the state’s permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources was confirmed in many resolutions and instruments.49 
Simultaneously, natural resource rights were increasingly affirmed for two 
distinct kinds of peoples: for indigenous peoples (discussed in this part) and 
for all citizens of an independent state (discussed in parts III and IV). 
It is well established that “peoples” in international law may refer to a 
portion of a population and especially to marginalized communities such as 
indigenous peoples or minority groups that have a particular interest in, or 
proximity to, specific territory or natural resources.50 Indeed, much of the 
international jurisprudence and literature on the right to freely dispose of 
natural resources focuses on indigenous peoples’ rights to natural 
resources.51 
This is likely because most of the legal disputes in which indigenous 
peoples have been involved have had some connection to resource 
 
this way, “There is a close relationship between Article 1 and 25 of the ICCPR.” While Article 1 
guarantees people’s free choice of political status and free pursuit of their economic, and cultural 
development, Article 25 “concerns the detail of how free choice is to be provided (periodic elections on 
the basis of universal suffrage, etc.).”) 
 47 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 21, The Right 
to Self-Determination, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/51/18, Annex. VIII (Mar. 8, 1996). As the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination has stated, these individual rights are linked to the people’s rights 
to internal self-determination. 
 48 CASSESE, supra note 45, at 144. 
 49 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. 168, 251 (Dec. 19) (in 2005, the I.C.J. determined that permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources is customary international law). 
 50 See Gilbert, supra note 18, at 26. 
 51 See James Anaya & Robert Williams, The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights over Lands 
and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 
79 (2001). 
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extraction.52 Over the last three decades, indigenous peoples have 
successfully pushed for the recognition of their rights to land and natural 
resources as part of their human rights. This has resulted in the emergence 
of a significant body of jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ natural 
resource rights.53 
Three major legal developments have supported this evolution, which 
this part will address in turn. The first concerns a reinterpretation of the right 
to self-determination and the meaning of sovereignty over natural resources. 
The second is the emergence of rights to participation and consent with 
regard to “developmental” resource projects located on indigenous 
territories. The third is a recognition of a fundamental link between natural 
resources and cultural rights. As argued below, by deploying human rights 
norms regarding self-determination, development, and cultural rights, 
indigenous peoples have achieved substantially heightened recognition of 
their rights over natural resources. 
A. The Revival of the Right to Self-determination over Natural Resources 
The right to self-determination has been one of the anchors of the 
decades-long indigenous movement, which has partly aimed at redressing 
the wrongs of colonization.54 More significantly, indigenous rights advocates 
have established new interpretations of the meaning of self-determination 
under international law.55 
Historically, the right to self-determination has been associated with a 
right to national political independence and statehood.56 Yet the Western 
legal conception of statehood is foreign to most indigenous communities, 
who organized their land and territories outside the Westphalian state system 
 
 52 See PATRICIA I. VASQUEZ, OIL SPARKS IN THE AMAZON: LOCAL CONFLICTS, INDIGENOUS 
POPULATIONS, AND NATURAL RESOURCES (2014); IN THE WAY OF DEVELOPMENT: INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES, LIFE PROJECTS, AND GLOBALIZATION (Mario Blaser, Harvey A. Feit, & Glenn McRae eds., 
2004). 
 53 See Anaya & Williams, supra note 51, at 33; see also JÉRÉMIE GILBERT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ 
LAND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM VICTIMS TO ACTORS (2016). 
 54 See ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS: SELF-
DETERMINATION, CULTURE, AND LAND (2007); JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004); KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2002); MAIVAN LAM, AT THE END OF THE STATE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF-
DETERMINATION (2000). 
 55 See Jeff Corntassel, Toward Sustainable Self-Determination: Rethinking the Contemporary 
Indigenous Rights Discourse, 33 ALTERNATIVES 105 (2008). 
 56 See Martti Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and 
Practice 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 241, 249 (1994); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A 
Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 177 (1991); CASSESE, supra note 45, at 71-74. 
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before the colonial era.57 Indigenous peoples have successfully argued that 
self-determination is not only or even mostly about statehood, but about their 
fundamental rights over their lands and natural resources.58 
The adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007 is a good illustration of this shift. 
The battle over the right to self-determination was at the heart of the twenty-
two years of negotiations that led to adoption of the Declaration.59 Most 
states’ representatives resisted the recognition of an indigenous right to self-
determination, which they feared meant a right to secession and the creation 
of independent states. Yet the indigenous advocates instead emphasized an 
interpretation of self-determination that centered on rights to govern their 
own land and natural resources. As the negotiations revealed, the 
overwhelming majority of indigenous peoples do not want to secede, but 
rather seek the protection of their traditional territories from further 
encroachment and the right to determine how natural resources will be 
used.60 
The negotiations over the drafting of the UNDRIP resulted in a 
compromise. Article 3 states that, “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
 
 57 See PAUL KEAL, EUROPEAN CONQUEST AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2003); 
ROBERT J. MILLER ET AL., DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS: THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN THE 
ENGLISH COLONIES (2012). 
 58 See INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: SELF-DETERMINATION, KNOWLEDGE, INDIGENEITY (Henry Minde ed., 
2008); Jeff Corntassel & Cheryl Bryce, Practicing Sustainable Self-Determination: Indigenous 
Approaches to Cultural Restoration and Revitalization, 18 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 151 (2011); Ted 
Moses, Self-Determination and the Survival of Indigenous Peoples, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION 155, 162 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2001) 
(as Ted Moses, the former Grand Chief of the Grand Council of the Crees, has stated: “Self-determination 
may make some people think of the right to vote, or the right to belong to political parties or the right to 
self-government. . . . But when I think of self-determination I think also of hunting, fishing, and trapping. 
I think of the land, of the water, the trees, and the animals.”). 
 59 See Timo Koivurova, From High Hopes to Disillusionment: Indigenous Peoples’ Struggle to 
(re)Gain Their Right to Self-Determination 15 INT’L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 1 (2008); Isabelle 
Schulte-Tenckhoff, Treaties, Peoplehood and Self-Determination: Understanding the Language of 
Indigenous Rights, in INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF THE UN DECLARATION 64 (Elvira Pulitano ed., 
2012). 
 60 See MAIVȂN CLECH LȂM, AT THE EDGE OF THE STATE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF-
DETERMINATION (2000); Erica-Irene A. Daes (Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations), Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples—Explanatory Note Concerning the Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26/Add.1, ¶ 26, (July 19, 
1993); James Anaya, A Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-Determination, 31 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 143 (1993) (as James Anaya, the former UN special rapporteur 
on the rights of indigenous peoples, noted “[F]ull self-determination, [which] necessarily means a right 
to choose independent statehood, ultimately rests on a narrow state-centered vision of humanity and the 
world . . . [that] is blind to the contemporary realities of . . . a world in which the formal boundaries of 
statehood do not altogether determine the ordering of communities and authority.”). 
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status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” 
Article 4 adds that “Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters 
relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for 
financing their autonomous functions.” However, Article 46 denies that the 
Declaration should be “construed as authorizing or encouraging any action 
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity 
or political unity of sovereign and independent states.” 
The Declaration marks a significant evolution in the international law 
of self-determination. It represents one of the first instruments to recognize 
the right of self-determination for peoples other than peoples territorially 
organized as states and colonies,61 and it moves the law from a post-colonial 
understanding of self-determination focused on political independence to a 
contemporary interpretation of self-determination concerning rights over 
natural resources. This does not mean that states have lost their ultimate 
sovereignty over natural resources, but that in exercising their sovereignty 
they must respect the rights of indigenous peoples over the natural resources 
located on their ancestral territories. This is what is referred to as the new 
“relational approach to self-determination.”62 
This new interpretation of self-determination as a “relational” principle 
is supported by the progressive jurisprudence of several international human 
rights bodies, which drew out its implications for common Article 1 of the 
human rights Covenants. 
Until the 1990s, little human rights jurisprudence concerned the 
implementation of Article 1 of the Covenants. Indeed, until it was used by 
indigenous peoples, the HRC did not include Article 1 as a ground for 
individual complaints.63 Several indigenous complaints then led the HRC to 
adopt a new approach to self-determination, within which it has referred 
several times to Article 1(2) of the Covenant in relation to indigenous 
peoples.64 For example, in its Concluding Observations on Canada in 1999, 
the HRC emphasized that “the right to self-determination requires, inter alia, 
 
 61 See Dorothée Cambou, The UNDRIP and the Legal Significance of the Right of Indigenous 
Peoples to Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach with a Multidimensional Perspective, 23 INT’L 
J. HUM. RTS. 34, 35 (2019). 
 62 Benedict Kingsbury, Reconstructing Self-Determination: A Relational Approach, in Aikio & 
Scheinin eds., supra note 58, at 19, 22. 
 63 See HRC, Chief Ominayak and Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 
(Mar. 26, 1990); HRC, Kitok v. Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (July 27, 1988); HRC, I. 
Länsman et al. v. Finland, UN Doc. CCPR/C/57/1 (June 11, 1992); HRC, J. Länsman et al. v. Finland, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (Aug. 28, 1995). 
 64 See, e.g., HRC, Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, UN Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (Oct. 
27, 2000). For analysis, see Martin Scheinin, The Right to Self-Determination Under the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, in Aikio & Scheinin eds., supra note 58, at 179. 
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that all peoples must be able to freely dispose of their natural resources and 
that they may not be deprived of their own means of subsistence (art. 1, para. 
2).”65 In the same year, the Committee invited Norway to report “on the Sami 
peoples’ right to self-determination under Article 1 of the Covenant, 
including paragraph 2 of that article.”66 The HRC also referred to indigenous 
peoples’ right to self-determination in its Concluding Observations on 
Mexico, Panama, Australia, Denmark, and Sweden.67 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
has adopted a similar approach, referring to Article 1 of its Covenant in 
several of its Concluding Observations.68 For instance, in its Concluding 
Observations regarding Paraguay, the CESCR expressed its concerns “about 
the fact that the State party has not yet legally recognized the right of 
indigenous peoples to dispose freely of their natural wealth and resources or 
put in place an effective mechanism to enable them to claim their ancestral 
lands (art. 1).”69 Thus, both the HRC and CESCR now interpret self-
determination as requiring that indigenous peoples play a role in decision-
making over the management of natural resources on their ancestral 
territories. 
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) has also supported this connection between self-determination and 
natural resources. In its General Recommendation XXI on the right to self-
determination, CERD pointed out that the right to self-determination implies 
an obligation for states to act to preserve the culture of ethnic groups within 
their territory. The Committee found that this obligation arises as a 
consequence of the right of self-determination, and stated that this right gives 
persons belonging to ethnic groups “the right to engage in such activities 
which are particularly relevant to the preservation of the identity of such 
 
 65 HRC, Concluding Observations: Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105, ¶ 8 (Apr. 7, 1999). 
 66 HRC, Concluding Observations: Norway, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.112, ¶ 17 (Oct. 26, 1999). 
 67 See HRC, Concluding Observations: Mexico, UN Doc. CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5 (Mar. 26, 2010); 
HRC, Concluding Observations: Panama, UN Doc. CCPR/C/PAN/CO/3 (Apr. 4, 2008); HRC, 
Concluding Observations: Australia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5 (Apr. 2, 2009); HRC, Concluding 
Observations: Denmark, UN Doc. CCPR/C/DNK/CO/5 (Oct. 13, 2008); HRC, Concluding 
Observations: Sweden, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE (Apr. 24, 2002). 
 68 See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Argentina, UN Doc. E/C.12/ARG/CO/3 (Dec. 14, 2011); 
CESCR, Concluding Observations: Finland, UN Doc. E/C.12/FIN/CO/6 (Dec. 17, 2014); CESCR, 
Concluding Observations: Guatemala, UN Doc. E/C.12/GTM/CO/3 (Dec. 9, 2014); CESCR, Concluding 
Observations: Cambodia, UN Doc. E/C.12/KHM/CO/1 (June 12, 2009). 
 69 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Paraguay, ¶ 6, UN Doc. E/C.12/PRY/CO/4 (Mar. 20, 2015). 
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persons or groups.”70 This right encompasses a right of indigenous peoples 
to participate in decisions affecting their territories.71 
This approach to self-determination has been echoed in the 
jurisprudence of the regional human rights institutions. The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has invoked Article 1 of the ICCPR and 
ICESCR to interpret the right of indigenous peoples over their ancestral 
natural resources. For example, in the case of the Saramaka People, the 
IACtHR explained that “property rights must be interpreted so as not to 
restrict their right to self-determination, by virtue of which indigenous 
peoples may ‘freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ 
and may ‘freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources’.”72 A similar 
approach was adopted in the case of the Kaliña and Lokono peoples against 
Suriname.73 The Court stated: “[T]he right to property protected by Article 
21 of the American Convention, and interpreted in light of the rights 
recognized in Article 1 common to the two Covenants, and Article 27 of the 
ICCPR which cannot be restricted when interpreting the American 
Convention in this case, confer on the members of the Kaliña and Lokono 
peoples the right to the enjoyment of their property in keeping with their 
community-based tradition.”74 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has also 
highlighted the connection between the indigenous right to self-
determination and control of natural resources. In its Endorois decision 
concerning Kenya, the Commission found that the non-respect of the right 
to land of the Endorois community violated Article 21 of the African Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights, which states that “[a]ll peoples shall freely 
dispose of their wealth and natural resources.”75 In finding a violation of 
Article 21, the Commission acknowledged that the right to freely dispose of 
 
 70 CERD, General Recommendation XXI (Forty-eighth session) on Self-Determination, ¶ 5, UN 
Doc. A/51/18, annex VIII (Mar. 8, 1996). 
 71 See CERD, General Recommendation XXIII (Fifty-first session) on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
UN Doc. A/52/18, annex V (Sept. 26, 1997) (calling upon state parties to ensure indigenous peoples 
effective participation, but making no mention of self-determination per se). 
 72 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 93 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
 73 Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 309 (Nov. 25, 2015). 
 74 Id. at ¶¶ 124, 126. Interestingly, the Court has also included an examination of Article 23 of the 
American Convention relating to the right to participate in government. 
 75 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on 
Behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya [Endorois Case], Communication 276/2003, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶ 268 (Feb. 4, 2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2010_africa_commission_ruling_0.pdf ; Org. of 
African Unity [OAU], African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights [African Charter] art. 21 ¶ 1, 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5 21, I.L.M. 58 (1982) (June 27, 1981). 
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natural resources is of crucial importance to indigenous peoples and their 
way of life.76 This was later confirmed in the African Court’s decision 
regarding the Ogiek community, in which the Court ruled that the 
government of Kenya had violated Article 21 of the Charter by restricting 
access to territories and natural resources that were essential to guarantee the 
Ogiek’s access to food.77 
Overall, a survey of the human rights treaty monitoring bodies and the 
regional human rights institutions demonstrates a substantive international 
jurisprudence affirming the self-determination rights of indigenous peoples 
over natural resources located on their ancestral territories. 
B. “Self-determined Development” and the Right to Free, Prior, and 
Informed Consent 
The principle of self-determined development arose as a reaction to 
what indigenous communities across the world have called “imposed 
development” and “development aggression.”78 This refers to the imposition 
of top-down economic development policies, usually involving major 
projects to exploit natural resources on indigenous territory. Indigenous 
peoples have often become victims of such policies, with the “development” 
projects leading to forced displacement, land dispossession, and 
environmental degradation.79 In response, indigenous peoples have called for 
the recognition of a right to “self-determined development,” a hybrid of the 
right to self-determination and the right to development.80 
This call for self-determined development was answered in 1986 in the 
UN Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRTD).81 Its Preamble 
recalls “the right of peoples to exercise . . . full and complete sovereignty 
over all their natural wealth and resources,” and Article 1(2) states that “the 
human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of 
peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant 
provisions of both International Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of 
 
 76 Endorois Case, supra note 75; see also, Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center 
for Economic, and Social Rights v. Nigeria [SERAC v. Nigeria], Communication 155/96, Afr. Comm’n 
H.P.R., (May 27, 2002), https://www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/English/achpr30_155_96_eng.pdf 
(showing the correlation between cultural rights and access to natural resources). 
 77 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya [Ogiek Case], App. 
No. 006/2012, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], ¶ 201 (May 26, 2017). 
 78 See Cathal Doyle & Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples and Globalization: From “Development 
Aggression” to “Self-Determined Development”, 8 EUR. Y.B. OF MINORITY ISSUES 219, 220, 223 (2009). 
 79 See IN THE WAY OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 52. 
 80 See INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ INT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y RSCH. & EDUC. [TEBTEBBA], TOWARDS AN 
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ SELF-DETERMINED DEVELOPMENT 
(Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Leah Enkiwe-Abayao, & Raymond de Chavez eds., 2010). 
 81 G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development, at Pmbl. (Dec. 1986). 
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their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and 
resources.” 
Indigenous peoples have contributed positively to specifying concrete 
and justiciable rights to development.82 These rights retained the Covenants’ 
idea of a people’s right to freely dispose of its natural resources, specified as 
a right of peoples to participate in decisions which impact their ancestral 
territories. 
The Endorois case is a good illustration of this.83 The case concerned 
the forced removal of an indigenous community in the name of development 
(tourism and mining), which resulted in the community losing access to 
essential natural resources (water and pastoral lands). Linking self-
determination with development, the community highlighted that they had 
“suffered a loss of well-being through the limitations on their choice and 
capacities, including effective and meaningful participation in projects that 
will affect them.”84 The African Commission ruled that regarding “any 
development or investment projects that would have a major impact within 
the Endorois territory, the state has a duty not only to consult with the 
community, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, 
according to their customs and traditions.”85 
This is one of the first international human rights cases to affirm 
communities’ right to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC).86 The 
establishment of a right to FPIC is one of the most significant developments 
in the human rights-based approach to natural resources management.87 It 
recognizes that indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop 
priorities for the use of their lands or territories and other resources. This 
requirement has been endorsed by international human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies. For example, in its 1999 Annual Report on Canada, the 
HRC links aboriginal self-government with the right freely to dispose of 
natural resources and urges the government to address issues of land and 
resource allocation.88 Likewise, in its 2014 review of the United States, the 
HRC urged the government to “ensure that consultations are held with the 
 
 82 See Jérémie Gilbert & Corinne Lennox, Towards New Development Paradigms: The United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a Tool to Support Self-Determined 
Development, 23 INT. J. HUM. RTS. 104 (2019). 
 83 Endorois Case, supra note 75 at ¶ 268. 
 84 Id. at ¶ 129. 
 85 Id. at ¶ 291. 
 86 For analysis, see Jérémie Gilbert, Litigating Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Africa: Potentials, 
Challenges, and Limitations, 66 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 657 (2017). 
 87 See CATHAL DOYLE, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TITLE TO TERRITORY, RIGHTS AND RESOURCES: THE 
TRANSFORMATIVE ROLE OF FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT (2014). 
 88 HRC, Concluding Observations: Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105, ¶ 8 (Apr. 7, 1999). 
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indigenous communities that might be adversely affected by the state party’s 
development projects and exploitation of natural resources with a view to 
obtaining their free, prior and informed consent for proposed project 
activities.”89 In a similar fashion, the CESCR committee has urged Colombia 
to seek the consent of the indigenous peoples concerned by the 
implementation of timber, soil, and sub-soil mining projects affecting them.90 
The Inter-American Commission, in a case concerning a Mayan 
community in Belize, recognized that the authorities had violated the rights 
of the community to property by allowing the exploitation of timber and oil 
on their ancestral lands without the community’s full informed consent.91 
The Commission highlighted that such consent requires “at a minimum, that 
all of the members of the community are fully and accurately informed of 
the nature and consequences of the process and provided with an effective 
opportunity to participate individually or as collectives.”92 The Commission 
held that the obligation to obtain indigenous peoples’ “consent applies to all 
state decisions, including the granting of natural resource exploitation 
concessions, that may have an impact upon indigenous lands and 
communities.”93 
As these examples illustrate, since the adoption of the UNDRIP in 2007, 
a significant body of decisions and recommendations from international 
human rights bodies have emphasized that development projects on 
indigenous territories need the free, prior and informed consent of the 
communities involved.94 The right to FPIC is a direct application of the right 
to self-determination over natural resources, requiring that indigenous 
peoples be able to give or withhold consent to development projects that 
would affect the natural resources of their ancestral lands. 
 
 89 HRC, Concluding Observations: United States, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, ¶ 25 (Aug. 23, 
2014). 
 90 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Colombia, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.74, ¶¶ 12, 33 (Nov. 30, 
2001); see also Concluding Observations: Brazil, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.87, (May 23, 2003). The CERD 
has also referenced indigenous peoples’ right to consent to decisions directly affecting them in many of 
its Concluding Observations. For a compilation of these recommendations, see Legal Companion to the 
UN-REDD Programme - Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC): International Law 
and Jurisprudence Affirming the Requirement of FPIC, UN-REDD PROGRAMME, Jan. 2013. 
 91 Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm’n. 
H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 doc. 5, rev. 1, ¶ 117 (2004). 
 92 Id. at ¶ 142. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See Mauro Barelli, Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges Ahead, 16 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2012); 
Tara Ward, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples’ Participation Rights 
within International Law, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 54 (2011). 
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C. Cultural Rights and Natural Resources 
Cultural rights are an important element of human rights law, embedded 
in several international and regional human rights treaties.95 Cultural rights 
are the third area of law used by indigenous peoples to press for recognition 
of their rights over natural resources. Human rights law recognizes that the 
protection of traditional practices of using natural resources can be essential 
to ensuring the cultural survival of indigenous peoples. 
An important legal norm supporting the connection between natural 
resources and indigenous cultural rights has been article 27 of the ICCPR, 
which reads: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their 
own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language.” This article has been interpreted to protect indigenous rights over 
natural resources. The connection between cultural rights and natural 
resources has been at the heart of several Concluding Observations and 
decisions in individual communications of the Committee.96 The HRC heard 
several complaints by indigenous peoples in the 1990s, and its decisions in 
cases such as Ominayak v Canada,97 Lansman v Finland,98 and Lovelace v 
Canada99 have become key elements of international jurisprudence.100 All of 
the Committee’s pronouncements emphasize that resource-related activities 
that form an essential element of indigenous peoples’ culture should be 
protected under article 27 of the ICCPR. 
The Inter-American system of human rights has also recognized the 
significant connection between cultural rights and natural resources for 
indigenous peoples. In several of its cases on indigenous peoples’ rights, the 
IACtHR has highlighted how traditional understandings of natural resources 
 
 95 UDHR, supra note 46, at art. 27; ICESCR, supra note 19, at art. 15; African Charter, supra note 
75, at art. 17; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights [IACHR], American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, art. 13, May 2, 1948, available at 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3710.html. For analysis, see ELSA STAMATOPOULOU, CULTURAL 
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ARTICLE 27 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
BEYOND (2007); THE CULTURAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Ana Vrdoljak ed., 2013). 
 96 See FOREST PEOPLES PROGRAMME, A COMPILATION OF UN TREATY BODY JURISPRUDENCE, 
SPECIAL PROCEDURES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, AND THE ADVICE OF THE EXPERT MECHANISM 
ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, Vol. V, at III (Fergus MacKay ed., 2013). 
 97 HRC, Chief Ominayak and Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 
(Mar. 26, 1990). 
 98 HRC, J. Länsman et al. v. Finland, UN Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
 99 HRC, Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, UN Doc. A/36/40 (July 30, 1981). 
 100 For analysis, see Martin Scheinin, The Right to Enjoy a Distinct Culture: Indigenous and 
Competing Uses of Land, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
INTERPRETIVE APPROACH (Theodore S. Orlin et al. eds., 2000), 163-64. 
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form an essential element of indigenous peoples’ right to cultural identity. In 
the Saramaka case, for instance, the Court highlighted that, for indigenous 
peoples, “the right to use and enjoy their territory would be meaningless in 
the context of indigenous and tribal communities if said right were not 
connected to the natural resources that lie on and within the land.”101 A 
similar approach has been adopted by the African Commission and Court.102 
In the Court’s ruling concerning the Ogiek community of Kenya, for 
example, it stated that, “in the context of traditional societies, where formal 
religious institutions often do not exist, the practice and profession of 
religion are usually inextricably linked with land and the environment. In 
indigenous societies in particular, the freedom to worship and to engage in 
religious ceremonies depends on access to land and the natural 
environment.”103 
At least part of the success of indigenous peoples in asserting their right 
to dispose of natural resources is attributable to their unique and well-
recognized cultural rights. Both the Inter-American Court and the African 
Commission “draw a clear link between the recognition of indigenous 
peoples’ substantive rights to own, use, occupy, control, and develop their 
traditional land and resources and the cultural survival of indigenous 
communities.”104 The significance placed on the survival of a group’s 
traditions and customs is clear. Indeed, the Inter-American Court explicitly 
states that when determining what limits to the right are permissible, a 
“crucial factor to be considered is whether the restriction amounts to a denial 
of their traditions and customs in a way that endangers the very survival of 
the group and of its members.”105 Since the exploitation of land and resources 
are recognized as potentially jeopardizing the cultural survival of indigenous 
groups, courts and UN treaty bodies have been particularly vigilant in 
recognizing indigenous rights to natural resources. 
In sum, from the 1980s onward, advocates for indigenous peoples 
invigorated the links between international human rights law and peoples’ 
rights over natural resources. Indigenous peoples challenged the orthodox 
state-centered interpretations of sovereignty and self-determination over 
 
 101 Saramaka People v. Suriname, supra note 72, ¶ 122; see also Case of the Kichwa Indigenous 
People of Sarayaku, Merits and Reparation, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 220 (June 
27, 2012); Case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 ¶ 135 (June 17, 2005). 
 102 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on the Protection of Sacred 
Natural Sites and Territories, ACHPR /Res. 372 (LX) (May 22, 2017) (the Commission makes a direct 
connection between human rights and state obligations to protect and respect natural sacred sites). 
 103 Ogiek Case, supra note 77, at ¶ 164; see also Endorois Case, supra note 75. 
 104 Miranda, supra note 30, at 820. 
 105 Saramaka People v. Suriname, supra note 72, at ¶ 128. 
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natural resources, adding a human rights-based dimension which insists on 
the resource rights of peoples. In doing so, they moved the legal discussion 
from a theoretical debate about sovereignty over natural resources to a more 
practical emphasis on consent and cultural attachment. 
III. THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 
International law recognizes three types of “peoples” as having rights 
over natural resources: peoples under colonial occupation (examined in Part 
I), indigenous peoples (examined in Part II), and all of the citizens of an 
independent state (examined here). Respect for the rights of citizens of 
independent states are of the greatest importance for peace and good 
governance in resource-rich states and regions. These rights are sometimes 
misunderstood, so in this part we take up three preliminary points before 
discussing the historical specification of the content of the rights in Part IV. 
First, we discuss the meaning of the term “people” in international law. 
Second, we expand on how international law divides resource rights between 
citizens and states. Third, we show how citizens’ rights over resources are 
compatible with a wide variety of political and economic systems and that 
citizens’ rights in no way require “resource nationalism.” 
A. “People” as All Citizens of a State 
Understanding the meaning of the term “people” is essential for correct 
interpretation of the many international instruments in which it occurs.106 As 
we have seen, “people” can often refer to indigenous and other national sub-
groups, yet the term does not refer exclusively to such groups.107 
Authoritative bodies, such as the CESCR, often refer to “people” in the sense 
of “all citizens of a state.”108 Indeed, the CESCR has helped to establish this 
as a focal sense of “people” by “insisting that states are procedurally 
accountable to the ‘general public,’ as the relevant ‘people,’ in their dealings 
with the state’s natural resources.”109 
For example, in its 1997 Concluding Observations for Azerbaijan, the 
CESCR “calls attention to [A]rticle 1 on the right of self-determination,” 
stresses that the state must manage the privatization of the country’s oil 
 
 106 BEN SAUL, DAVID KINLEY, & JACQUELINE MOWBRAY, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES, AND MATERIALS 25–27 (2014). 
 107 Neither the ICESCR nor the ICCPR specifically mention “indigenous” peoples, and in no case or 
commentary have rights over natural resources been interpreted as applying only to indigenous peoples 
or other subgroups. 
 108 See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) [Guinea 
v. DRC], Judgement, 2010 I.C.J. 639, ¶ 66 (Nov. 30) (the opinions of the treaty bodies are significant, as 
these opinions are recognized as having substantial weight by the International Court of Justice). 
 109 Saul, Kinley, & Mowbray, supra note 106, at 52. 
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resources in a way that is “sufficiently transparent to ensure fairness and 
accountability,” and regrets that it is not able to assess the extent that “the 
general public is able to participate” in this privatization.110 Similarly, in its 
2009 Concluding Observations on the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), the CESCR uses the “all citizens” sense of “people” instead of 
limiting Article 1(2) to a specific subgroup or community.111 Concerned with 
the manner in which the DRC’s extensive mineral resources are being 
exploited, the CESCR calls on the DRC government to “review without 
delay the mining contracts in a transparent and participatory way” and to 
“repeal all contracts which are detrimental to the Congolese people.”112 
Finally, in respect to Article 1(2), in its 2009 Concluding Observations on 
Cambodia, the CESCR focuses on the people of Cambodia as a whole when 
it strongly recommends that the “granting of economic concessions take into 
account the need for sustainable development and for all Cambodians to 
share in the benefits of progress.” 113 The CESCR again ascribes the right to 
all of the citizens of the state. 
The Human Rights Committee has been less engaged than the CESCR 
in clarifying common Article 1(2) of the Covenants.114 It has, however, 
addressed the right freely to dispose of natural resources and demonstrated 
its preference for a wide interpretation of the term “people.”115 Moreover, in 
its 1984 comment on the right to self-determination of peoples, the HRC 
states that Article 1 of the ICCPR affirms the “inalienable” right of all 
peoples freely to “determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.”116 Article 1(2) “affirms a 
 
 110 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Azerbaijan, E/C.12/1/Add.20, ¶ 16 (Dec. 22, 1997). The 
CESCR further states that the “ability of people to defend their own economic, social and cultural rights 
depends significantly on the availability of public information . . . it is important that the privatization 
process should be conducted in an open and transparent manner and that the conditions under which oil 
concessions are granted should always be made public.” Id. ¶ 29. In the case of Azerbaijan, there was no 
subset of the population within the country that was specifically affected by the oil concessions; the 
Committee uses “people” to refer to the citizenry as a whole. 
 111 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of Congo, E/C.12/COD/CO/4, ¶ 13 
(Dec. 16, 2009). 
 112 Id. Importantly, the CESCR purposely frames its call to action in broad terms (“the Congolese 
people”) instead of focusing on the specific community that would be most affected by the exploitation 
of natural resources (those Congolese living in Katanga). This suggests that while local populations may 
have special interests in their region’s natural resources, the right of Article 1(2) is held in the first instance 
by all of the citizens of the state. 
 113 CESCR, Concluding Observations: Cambodia, E/C.12/KHM/CO/1, ¶ 15 (June 12, 2009). 
 114 SARAH JOSEPH & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY, 162 (3d ed. 2013). 
 115 For example, when it criticized Azerbaijan’s narrow view of self-determination as only applying 
to colonized peoples. HRC, Concluding Observations: Azerbaijan, supra note 110, ¶ 6. 
 116 HRC, General Comment No 12: Article 1 (Right to Self-Determination), 21st Sess., ¶ 2 (Mar. 13, 
1984). 
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particular aspect of the economic content of the right of self-determination,” 
namely the right of peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources.117 The broad right of self-determination of peoples is of particular 
importance, the HRC says, “because its realization is an essential condition 
for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and 
for the promotion and strengthening of those rights.”118 As individual human 
rights are not limited to subgroups or populations under colonial control, it 
is reasonable to presume that the HRC interprets Article 1(2) as applying to 
the whole citizenry of independent states. 
This interpretation is further supported by the statement of the CERD 
on the right to self-determination of peoples,119 and in the work of the African 
human rights institutions.120 For example, in its communication on Front for 
the Liberation of the State of Cabinda v. Republic of Angola, the Commission 
is explicit that the term “peoples” in the Article of the African Charter 
dealing with natural resources can mean either the entire people of a state or 
a people within the state.121 
 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. ¶ 1. 
 119 “The right to self-determination of peoples has an internal aspect, that is to say, the rights of all 
peoples to pursue freely their economic, social, and cultural development without outside interference. In 
that respect there exists a link with the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs 
at any level . . . Governments are to represent the whole population without distinction as to race, colour, 
descent or national or ethnic origin.” CERD, General Recommendation XXI, supra note 70, ¶ 4 (emphasis 
added). See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 23, at 2. 
 120 In its discussion of natural resource rights in the African Charter, the African Commission affirms 
that “[a]lthough natural resources under Article 21 are often localized in a particular region, this does not 
mean that entitlement to the benefits from the sustainable and human rights compliant use of such natural 
resources is limited to affected people living on or near such territory – the peoples of the State as a whole 
are also entitled to benefit from such resources.” ACHPR, supra note 17, ¶ 23. See also the Commission’s 
explicit definitions of “people” in ¶ 14, which includes both “the entire population of a State’” and “sub-
national groups.” Id. ¶ 14. The Commission further demonstrates its support for the wide interpretation 
of the term “people” by calling on state parties to reaffirm that the “state has the main responsibility for 
ensuring natural resources stewardship with, and for the interest of, the population” and must ensure 
“participation, including the free, prior and informed consent of communities, in decision making related 
to natural resource governance.” AFR. COMM’N, Resolution on a Human Rights-based Approach to 
Natural Resource Governance, Res. 224, 51st Sess., ¶ 15 (2012) (emphasis added). By choosing to use 
both the general term “population” and the more specific term “communities” in reference to the right to 
freely dispose of natural resources, the Commission favors a broad interpretation over a narrow one that 
would limit “people” only to subsets of the population. 
 121 Front for the Liberation of the State of Cabinda v. Republic of Angola, Communication 328/06, 
AFR. COMM’N H.P.R., [Angola], ¶ 130 (Nov. 5, 2013). Furthermore, the Commission has prioritized 
membership in national peoples over membership in subnational peoples in cases where the two have 
conflicted. When presented with a plea to recognize the independence of the Katangese people from 
Zaire, the Commission demurred partly because no evidence had been submitted that the human right of 
individuals in Katanga to participate in government was being denied. As individuals in Katanga could 
participate in the government of Zaire, their human right to participate was fulfilled by their rights as 
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It is also the opinion of scholars of international law that the right of 
peoples to freely dispose of natural wealth and resources did not originally 
apply to identity-based communities within the territorial boundaries of a 
state.122 Lillian Miranda argues that common Article 1(2) of the Covenants 
is best understood as mediating the relationship between the state and the 
national polity, and that it creates obligations for the government of a state 
to its people as a whole.123 This is consistent with other rights protected by 
the Covenants, all of which are rights exercised by citizens against their state. 
Thus, the preponderance of evidence supports an interpretation of 
international legal texts that often understands a “people” as designating all 
of the citizens of an independent state. 
B. The “Internal-External” Interpretation of Peoples’ and States’ 
Resource Rights 
International law ascribes to peoples internal rights over resources, to 
be claimed against the state, and ascribes to states external rights over 
resources, to be claimed against other states. Peoples’ rights over resources 
are thus an aspect of internal self-determination, while states’ rights over 
resources are an aspect of external self-determination. 
Today, the “internal-external” interpretation of peoples’ and states’ 
rights to natural resources is endorsed by many authoritative sources, as 
illustrated in the African context. The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights uses similar language to describe the rights of “peoples” and 
“states” over natural resources: Article 21(1) asserts the right of peoples to 
freely dispose of natural resources while Article 21(4) recognizes the rights 
of states to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.124 
To resolve this tension, the African Commission has explained that the 
people’s right is an internal one against its state, while the state’s right is an 
external one against other states. For the external right, the African 
Commission has said in its Guidelines for National Periodic Reports that 
Article 21 ensures that the material wealth of states is not exploited by aliens 
for no or little benefit to the African countries.125 Similarly, in its Angola 
communication, the Commission states that “Article 21 of the Charter . . . 
 
citizens within the national people. Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Communication 75/92, AFR. 
COMM’N H.P.R. ¶ 6 (Oct. 1995). 
 122 See, e.g., Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in the Context of Human Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 141, 154 (2011); Siegfried Wiessner, The 
Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
121, 133 (2011). 
 123 Miranda, supra note 30, at 800. 
 124 African Charter, supra note 75. 
 125 ACHPR, supra note 17, at 16. 
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triggers an obligation on the part of the state parties to protect their citizens 
from exploitation by external economic powers.”126 
At the same time, the Commission has also confirmed that Article 21 
of the Charter carries with it internal rights held by peoples, which place 
duties upon their states. In Resolution 224, A Human Rights-Based Approach 
to Natural Resource Governance, the Commission asserts that the state has 
the main responsibility for ensuring natural resource stewardship with, and 
in the interest of, the population.127 The Commission is even more firm in its 
2017 guidance on Article 21, which refers to the “the unquestionable and 
inalienable right to self-determination” of peoples in Article 20. 
First and foremost, the right to freely dispose of wealth and natural 
resources is an inviolable right of all peoples, an extension and central 
element of the right to self-determination provided for in Article 20 of the 
Charter. The right and the entitlements arising from it belong to peoples. 
States only have a delegated role entailing the exercise of this right. Article 
21 is emphatic that this role of states must be executed in the exclusive 
interest of the people. The last provision of Article 21(5) explicitly affirms 
that peoples of states party to the African Charter are entitled to “fully benefit 
from the advantages derived from their national resources.”128 
Legal scholars support the principle that peoples’ rights to their natural 
resources correspond to duties owed to them by their state as a trustee.129 In 
sum, when international instruments ascribe resource rights to states, these 
are most plausibly understood as external rights of a state against other states. 
When these instruments ascribe resource rights to peoples, these are most 
plausibly understood as internal rights of citizens against their state, 
corresponding to state duties toward its citizens. 
C. A People’s Resource Rights Do Not Require Resource Nationalism 
When discussing the rights of citizens over natural resources, it is worth 
bearing in mind that many early debates over these rights took place at the 
height of the Cold War.130 One lingering legacy of the ideological battles 
 
 126 Angola, supra note 121, ¶ 129. 
 127 ACHPR, Resolution on a Human-Rights Based Approach to Natural Resource Governance, Res. 
224, at 1 (May 2, 2012). 
 128 ACHPR, supra note 17, at 10; AFR. COMM’N, Resolution on the Niamey Declaration on Ensuring 
the Upholding of the African Charter in the Extractive Industries Sector, ACHPR/Res. 367 (LX), at 1 
(2017). 
 129 See, e.g., Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural 
Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33, 65 (2006); Miranda, supra note 30, at 
804; Richard Kiwanuka, The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
82 AM. J. INT’L L. 80 (1988). 
 130 Schrijver, supra note 27, at 6. 
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between capitalism and communism is the mistaken idea that any rights 
ascribed to “peoples” require some form of continuing collective ownership 
and control. 
In this context, it is critical that the legal rights of peoples over resources 
be understood as permissive in two ways. First, these rights do not require 
any specific political-economic system to be institutionalized within a state. 
Second, these rights do not require “resource nationalism”: that is, they are 
neutral regarding state ownership or control over natural resources. Both of 
these points can be demonstrated by surveying how citizens’ rights over 
natural resources are declared within national constitutions. 
Rights of the people over natural resources are proclaimed in national 
constitutions in all world regions.131 Many of these constitutions use 
propertarian language (for example, “natural resources belong to the people” 
or “are owned by the people”).132 While all of these national constitutions 
affirm the right of the people over natural resources, the diversity of these 
instruments show that these rights do not require any particular political or 
economic model. Both resource privatization to individuals and state 
resource management, for example, are compatible with the people’s rights. 
This can be seen by comparing three states’ constitutional and statutory 
provisions for natural resource ownership. According to the Mexican 
constitution, resource privatization is permitted.133 Zambia’s 2005 draft 
constitution, on the other hand, sets itself against privatization.134 Papua New 
Guinea’s Land Act designates the great bulk of the country’s land (currently 
 
 131 For example, in the constitutions of Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Kiribati, 
Liberia, Moldova, Mongolia, Niger, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Vietnam. 
See Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&q=natural%20resources 
&status=in_force (last visited Feb. 12, 2021) (providing sections concerning “natural resources” in the 
respective constitutions for each country). 
 132 For example: “The natural resources belong to the people.” SENEGAL [CONSTITUTION] 2001 rev. 
2016, art. 25-1; “Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.” 
IRAQ [CONSTITUTION] 2005, art. 111; “The land, its mineral wealth, atmosphere, water and other natural 
resources within the territory of Ukraine, the natural resources of its continental shelf, and the exclusive 
(maritime) economic zone, are objects of the right of property of the Ukrainian people.” UKRAINE 
[CONSTITUTION] 1996 with amendments through 2016, art. 13. 
 133 “The Nation has an original right of property over the land and waters within the boundaries of 
the national territory. The Nation has and will have the right to transfer its property’s domain to private 
individuals in order to create private property rights.” MEXICO [CONSTITUTION] 1917 with amendments 
through 2019, art. 27. Article 27 further specifies: “The Nation owns what follows: all natural resources 
at both the continental platform and the islands’ seafloor . . . all the oil and all solid, liquid and gaseous 
hydrocarbons.” The Mexican constitution carefully distinguishes “the Nation” (la Nación) from “the 
State” (el Estado). 
 134 “The State shall devise land policies which recognize ultimate ownership of land by the people.”; 
“The management and development of Zambia’s natural resources shall not bestow private ownership of 
any natural resource.” ZAMBIA [CONSTITUTION of Zambia Act, 2005 (the “Mung’omba Draft”)] 1, art. 
10v, 339f. 
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97 percent) as “customary land,” “owned by the Indigenous People of Papua 
New Guinea.”135 
Privatization to individual owners (as in the United States), 
management by a national authority (as in Norway and Venezuela), 
indigenous rights (as in Papua New Guinea), and mixed systems (as in 
Indonesia) are all legal regimes that are compatible with the rights of citizens 
over natural resources. The natural resources of a state start out in the 
people’s hands at independence—as a United Nations special commission 
once put it, the country’s natural resources are a people’s “birthright.”136 
After independence, citizens may then “freely dispose” of their resources in 
many different ways. Depending on how citizens freely dispose of the 
territory’s resources, any number of resource management regimes may 
result. “Resource nationalism,” where the state owns or controls the 
territory’s key natural resources, is one possibility but is in no way required. 
Resource privatization is, as the national laws above show, equally available 
as an option. A people’s right to dispose of their resources is a discretionary 
right, and so is neutral as to the disposition of resource ownership that will 
result from its exercise. 
IV. THE CONTENT OF RESOURCE RIGHTS: CITIZENS’ RIGHTS AND STATE 
DUTIES 
International law recognizes that states enjoy external rights over a 
territory’s natural resources insofar as states have permanent sovereignty 
which must not be interfered with by other states.137 A state’s sovereign right, 
however, is not absolute; it is encumbered by the internal rights of its people 
freely to dispose of these same natural resources. This is consonant with the 
broader human rights project of ensuring state accountability to citizens 
through individual rights that create corresponding state obligations.138 While 
states’ rights correspond to duties on other states, human rights correspond 
to duties on the state to protect and empower citizens. 
The right of peoples to their natural resources has been recognized and 
elaborated by a variety of different sources acknowledged as persuasive in 
 
 135 See Palais Wilson (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People), Urgent Request. Violation of Indigenous Peoples’ Property Rights and 
the Right to Effective Remedy, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ¶ 4 (Jan. 31, 2011) 
https://archive.org/stream/PngUnsrip2011Final2ReducedSizeAnnexes/png-unsrip-2011-final2-reduced-
size-annexes_djvu.txt. 
 136 G.A. Res. 34/92, ¶ 3 (Dec. 12, 1979). 
 137 See supra, section IIIb. 
 138 See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, Human Rights, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 8 (2007). 
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the interpretation of international law.139 These include General Assembly 
Resolutions, both before and after the drafting of the Covenants, and the 
statements of the Covenants’ respective monitoring bodies.140 Consideration 
here has also been given to other regional human rights agreements and their 
treaty bodies, as these are treated, by the ICJ at least, as subsidiary means of 
determining the rules of international law.141 
Attending to all of these sources demonstrates that the general right of 
peoples over their natural resources is best understood as a set of rights, 
corresponding to three broad categories of state duties: substantive duties, 
procedural duties, and remedial duties. 
(1) Substantive rights require the state to use the territory’s natural 
resources in ways that benefit citizens; 
(2) procedural rights require states to act transparently, to provide 
public information regarding resource management, and to ensure 
participatory decision-making; and 
(3) remedial rights require the state to pursue asset recovery in cases 
where resources belonging to the people have been wrongfully expatriated. 
The content of these rights is now explored in more detail. 
A. Substantive Rights 
The principle that states owe a duty to their citizens to manage natural 
resources for their benefit has been affirmed throughout the post-war period. 
This duty has frequently been asserted as a corollary of the right to permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources. Article 1 of the 1962 Resolution on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources specifies that “the right of 
peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources must be exercised in the interests of their national development 
and the well-being of the people of the state concerned.”142 Similarly, Article 
5 of the 1966 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
requires that states pay due regard to the development needs and objectives 
 
 139 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31, opened for signature May 
23, 1969 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
 140 See, e.g., Guinea v. DRC, supra note 108, ¶ 66: The ICJ stated that “it should ascribe great weight 
to the interpretation adopted by this independent body that was established specifically to supervise the 
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of the people concerned.143 Article 2 of the 1970 Resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources of Developing Countries and Expansion 
of Domestic Sources of Accumulation for Economic Development says that 
nations and peoples must exercise their rights over natural resources for the 
well-being of the people of the state concerned.144 
In these early texts, the duty of the state to manage natural resources for 
the people’s “well-being” or “developmental needs” is firm but vague. It is 
left unspecified what aspects of citizens’ “well-being” must be attended by 
the state, and how much benefit is owed to the people from resource 
exploitation. Without further clarification, exactly what these duties require 
of states regarding the management of a country’s resources would have 
been uncertain. 
The language of the major human rights instruments provides this 
clarification along two dimensions. First, the human rights Covenants 
specify that states have a duty to prioritize the potential of natural resource 
exploitation to provide citizens with means of subsistence. Second, both the 
Covenants and the African Charter require that the benefits of resource 
exploitation be used only for the benefit of the people. Thus, on the first 
dimension, the treaties define a “floor” of citizen well-being: the benefits of 
resource exploitation must first be used to provide citizens with means of 
subsistence. On the second dimension, the treaties define a “wall” that states 
must respect: all of the benefits of resource exploitation must be devoted to 
public uses, not to other uses. 
Beginning with the “floor” that requires priority to citizens’ 
subsistence, recall the unequivocal language of the final sentence of common 
Article 1(2) of the Covenants: “In no case may a people be deprived of its 
own means of subsistence.”145 This language requires that benefits accruing 
from a state’s natural resources must first be directed toward securing 
citizens’ most basic needs, now and in the future. Any other use of these 
benefits, until this floor is reached, will deprive the people of its own means 
of subsistence. 
Moreover, state parties to the ICESCR are required under Article 2(1) 
to take steps “to the maximum of its available resources” to achieve the 
realization of the rights in that Covenant.146 This means that “governments 
must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources at their 
disposal to satisfy, as a matter of priority, their minimum core human rights 
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obligations, which include making sure that their fiscal regimes are adequate 
to support such progressive realization of human rights.”147 
This “floor” interpretation, which requires the exploitation of a nation’s 
resources be devoted first to meeting the basic needs of the nation’s people, 
is supported by the travaux préparatoires (drafting history) of the Covenants. 
Discussing the proposed language in Article 1(2), the delegate from El 
Salvador gave the following example of a case where a people was being 
deprived of its own means of subsistence: “In Nauru the only source of 
national wealth, phosphates, was being unwisely overexploited by a British 
company, with the result that in about 50 years’ time the population of the 
island would have to be resettled elsewhere because no resources would 
remain.”148 
This Nauru example is particularly revealing, because it shows that 
actions stretching over a long period (the overexploitation of phosphates for 
fifty years) can violate people’s resource rights if the people will lack means 
of subsistence after that time. Presumably, the violation of the people’s 
resource rights will be a matter of even greater urgency in cases where 
resources are being exploited in ways that currently leave citizens beneath 
the level of subsistence. The Nauru example also shows that the relevant 
resources are not limited to food and water, but also include resources whose 
exploitation yields a “source of national wealth” that can provide citizens 
with the means to subsist.149 
In SERAC v. Nigeria, the African Commission begins with a general 
analysis of the state obligations imposed by the resource rights guaranteed 
under the African Charter.150 At the primary level, the Commission finds the 
state obligation to respect fundamental rights, and in particular that “the state 
is obliged to respect the free use of resources owned or at the disposal of the 
individual alone or in any form of association with others . . . And with 
regard to a collective group, the resources belonging to it should be 
respected, as it has to use the same resources to satisfy its needs.”151 In 
interpreting the state duty to fulfill fundamental rights like this one, the 
 
 147 Gilbert, supra note 18, at 86. A 2015 ECJ ruling that annulled an EU-Morocco trade deal further 
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Commission says that this means “a positive expectation on the part of the 
state to move its machinery towards the actual realisation of the rights . . . . 
It could consist in the direct provision of basic needs such as food or 
resources that can be used for food (direct food aid or social security).”152 
Thus states have an obligation to use natural resources or resource revenues 
to secure a “floor” of the people’s subsistence needs. 
The “wall” dimension of the substantive rights of peoples requires that 
all of the proceeds of resource exploitation benefit the people, not other 
parties. This wall is marked in the final substantive article of both Covenants, 
which characterizes peoples’ resource rights in this way: “Nothing in the 
present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all 
peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and 
resources.”153 
The benefits of the country’s resources must be fully devoted to public 
purposes. Any use of these benefits where the people are not the primary 
beneficiaries will violate the right of a people to the full enjoyment of their 
natural wealth. 
This “wall” dimension of a people’s substantive resource rights is also 
affirmed in the African Charter, which states in Article 21 that: “All peoples 
shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be 
exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be 
deprived of it.”154 
The insistence on the exercise of resource rights in the exclusive interest 
of the people is reaffirmed later in the same article, in the context of foreign 
exploitation: “State parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate 
all forms of foreign exploitation, particularly that practiced by international 
monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages 
derived from their national resources.”155 
In its Angola communication, the African Commission highlights that 
peoples can be beneficiaries of the right in Article 21 to the extent that the 
Article imposes a duty on the state “to ensure that resources are effectively 
managed for the sole and equal benefit of the entire peoples of the state.”156 
And as the Commission stated in 2017, “[u]nderlying the right of peoples to 
freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources is the principle that the 
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use of natural resources should be for the exclusive interest and benefit of 
the citizens of a State.”157 
The multifarious modalities of state resource management may in some 
cases leave it uncertain whether either the “floor” or the “wall” of the 
people’s substantive rights are being breached. Yet some cases that breach 
the floor or the wall are beyond doubt. As Cassese says: 
 
Article 1(2) can have an impact in extreme situations, where it is relatively 
easy to demonstrate that a government is exploiting the natural resources 
in the exclusive interest of a small segment of the population and is thereby 
disregarding the needs of the vast majority of its nationals. Similarly, it may 
be invoked with some success where it is apparent that a government has 
surrendered control over its natural resources to another State or to foreign 
private corporations without ensuring that the people will be the primary 
beneficiaries of such an arrangement. Either of these situations would 
constitute a clear violation of Article 1(2) of the Covenants.158 
B. Procedural Rights 
Beyond substantive rights, contemporary interpretations of peoples’ 
rights to natural resources have also added procedural rights regarding 
natural resource management. Already in 1974, Article 7 of the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States made clear that every state has the 
responsibility to “ensure the full participation of its people in the process and 
benefits of development.”159 This is the historical transition point between 
the older focus on the duty of states to use natural resources for the benefit 
of their people and a newer emphasis on the state duty to ensure participation 
by the citizenry. 
The duty to ensure participation was significantly elaborated by the 
General Assembly in its 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development.160 
Article 1(2) of the Declaration reintroduces the concept of peoples’ 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, which had lain dormant since 
Chile unsuccessfully proposed including language of peoples’ permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources in the Covenants in 1952.161 Article 1(1) 
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states that the human right to development entitles every human person to 
participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development. Similarly, Article 2(3) places a duty on states to develop 
policies to improve the well-being of the entire population on the basis of 
their active, free, and meaningful participation. Finally, Article 8(2) calls on 
states to encourage popular participation in all spheres as an important factor 
in development and in the full realization of human rights. 
Simultaneous with the rise of citizens’ rights to participate in resource 
decisions, parallel rights were being affirmed in cognate areas of the law and 
especially with respect to the environment. For example, the Rio Declaration 
of 1992 states that, “Each individual shall have appropriate access to 
information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities . . . 
and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes.”162 Such 
participatory rights regarding environmental matters were further detailed in 
the Aarhus Convention of 1998, now ratified by 47 parties in Europe and 
Central Asia.163 The African Commission has also found that a people’s right 
to a “general satisfactory environment favorable to their development” under 
Article 24 of the African Charter requires states to make relevant 
environmental information public and to give meaningful opportunities for 
individuals to be heard and to participate in the development decisions that 
affect their communities.164 
Returning to citizens’ procedural rights over their natural resources 
proper, the CESCR has provided significant guidance on the content of these 
rights. While the CESCR has never provided a list of the specific procedural 
duties that Article 1(2) requires, its numerous reports set out three procedural 
duties that bind states in relation to natural resources. 
First, the CESCR repeatedly calls on states to act with greater 
transparency in their decision-making around natural resources. Referring to 
Article 1(2), in its 1997 Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, the CESCR 
stresses the need for transparency, fairness, and accountability in relation to 
the privatization of the country’s oil resources.165 Similarly, in its 2009 
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Concluding Observations on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the 
CESCR criticizes the government’s lack of transparency around the review 
process for new and existing mining contracts.166 
Second, the CESCR emphasizes that the human rights framework 
includes the right for those affected by decisions to participate in the relevant 
decision-making process and specifically applies this right in relation to 
Article 1(2).167 In its 2009 Concluding Observations on the DRC, the CESCR 
urges the government to review mining contracts in a participatory fashion.168 
It also encourages national debate on investment in agriculture in its 2009 
Concluding Observations on Madagascar.169 As noted above, the CESCR’s 
call for national accountability and debate in the Azerbaijan case shows that 
participation is a right held by all the citizens of the state. 
Third, the CESCR suggests that free and fair elections are a crucial 
component of the right to participate. It also warns that such elections are not 
sufficient to ensure that vulnerable citizens, such as those living in poverty, 
will enjoy the right to participate in key decisions affecting their lives.170 
Regional human rights agreements, and their implementation bodies, 
also affirm the procedural rights of citizens over their natural resources. The 
2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights declares in Article 2(1) that “All 
peoples have the right of self-determination and control over their natural 
wealth and resources.”171 As noted above, Article 21 of the African Charter 
asserts the right of peoples to participate in the management of their natural 
resources, echoing Article 1(2) of the ICESCR and ICCPR when it states 
that, “[a]ll peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.” 
The African Commission, in its 2017 interpretation of the articles in the 
African Charter related to extractives, requires that states “ensure that the 
public is availed [of] adequate opportunities for consultation about [sic] rich 
and rigorous participation in decision-making processes on plans for both 
industrial exploration and extraction of natural resources.”172 More, in a rare 
joint declaration, and one specifically on natural resource governance, the 
Inter-American Commission and the African Commission affirmed the right 
of access to information and to documents generated by the government, or 
to which the government is a party, that are necessary for citizens to 
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understand the extent and value of their natural resources and the payments 
for those resources received and disbursed by their governments.173 
Finally, the transnational drive toward greater transparency around 
natural resource extraction has been supported by state legislation, such as 
the U.S. Dodd Frank Act, the European Union Accounting and Transparency 
Directive, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, as well 
as by voluntary initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative and civil society coalitions such as Publish What You Pay.174 
C. Remedial Rights 
States have both substantive and procedural duties regarding citizens’ 
rights over resources, and violation of either of these types of rights may 
trigger remedial state duties. The law regarding remedy is most extensively 
developed in the African context, perhaps because of the unusually specific 
language in the African Charter.175 
As noted above, Article 21(1) of the African Charter provides for the 
general right of peoples to their natural resources. In its Guidelines on Article 
21, the African Commission has remarked that “the right to remedy is 
inherent in and central to all human rights and is also embedded in the right 
to access to justice.”176 Moreover, Article 21(2) provides a concrete remedial 
right for people in relation to their natural resources, declaring that, “[i]n case 
of spoliation[,] the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful 
recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation.”177 While 
the Commission has interpreted the language of spoliation primarily in terms 
of the dispossession of land, it has not limited the language to this scenario.178 
This requirement of a specific remedy may develop further into a tool for 
ensuring adequate regard for people’s natural resource rights. 
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Additionally, in terms of state reporting requirements, the African 
Commission requires state parties to report on their grievance mechanisms 
for violations of any of the Charter’s rights. In the context of the extractive 
industries, the Commission requires states to report on their judicial and non-
judicial complaints mechanisms to adjudicate grievances, to report on their 
provision of legal aid to enable access to those mechanisms, and to publish 
statistics on how extensively these mechanisms are being used.179 
As this section has shown, the regional human rights bodies such as the 
African Commission and the Inter-American Commission have been 
particularly concerned to fill in the detail of peoples’ substantive, procedural, 
and remedial resource rights. Since human rights jurisprudence from these 
regional institutions is based on principles of cross-pollination and cross-
fertilization, the jurisprudence developed by these regional institutions will 
have resonance in other jurisdictions across the globe.180 Moreover, as the 
ICJ has argued, just as it ascribes great weight to the interpretations of the 
ICCPR by the HRC, it must for the same reasons take account of the regional 
bodies of their respective treaties. Respecting the interpretation of all human 
rights institutions “achieve[s] the necessary clarity and the essential 
consistency of international law, as well as legal security, to which both the 
individuals with guaranteed rights and the States obliged to comply with 
treaty obligations are entitled.”181 For the sake of the rule of law in 
international affairs, the detailed interpretations of human rights developed 
by these human rights institutions should set the standard against which 
alternative interpretations can be measured. 
V. THE FUTURE OF CITIZENS’ RESOURCE RIGHTS 
This article has discussed the bases in international law for affirming 
peoples’ rights over natural resources as one dimension of peoples’ right to 
self-determination. Three types of groups hold such rights. Peoples living 
under colonial occupation or trusteeship hold the rights against exploitation 
of their natural resources. Indigenous peoples hold rights over the natural 
resources located in their ancestral territories, including a right to exercise 
their free, prior, and informed consent before any development takes place 
on their lands and territories, and respect for the cultural rights connected to 
 
 179 Id. ¶ 19. 
 180 See Chiara Giorgetti, Cross-Fertilisation of Procedural Law Among International Courts and 
Tribunals: Methods and Meanings, in PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS (Arman Sarvarian et al. eds., 2015); TOWARDS CONVERGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW: APPROACHES OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS (Carla Buckley, Alice Donald, 
& Philip Leach eds., 2016). 
 181 Guinea v. DRC, supra note 108, ¶¶ 66–67. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
68 
the use of their territory’s resources. All citizens of independent states have 
rights (subject to both a “floor” and a “wall”) to benefit from the exploitation 
of the territory’s natural resources. They also have rights to meaningful 
participation in decision-making over these resources, and rights to access 
remedies in case these rights are not fulfilled. 
The rights of peoples over natural resources correspond to significant 
state obligations and duties toward their citizens. For example, the African 
Commission says that state parties to the African Charter have general 
obligations to recognize the rights enshrined in the Charter and to adopt 
legislative or other measures to give them effect. This implies specific duties 
to incorporate Charter-based rights into national laws, to ensure effective and 
adequately resourced institutions to supervise and enforce the corresponding 
standards, and to provide administrative and juridical mechanisms for 
seeking redress. States must also adopt beneficial legislation controlling all 
aspects of revenue generation from the extractive industries, including 
transparency over all systems that manage concessions and measures to 
prevent illicit financial flows.182 
States may fail in their duties toward peoples through omission or 
commission, and failures to respect peoples’ rights often occur because of 
weak regulatory regimes in the extractive sector. As the African Commission 
said in 2017, weak regulation can result in “human rights abuses [such as] 
lack of transparency about and egregious abuse by national actors of 
revenues received from the extractive industries.”183 The Commission adds 
that peoples must be “provided with the legal guarantee to participate in the 
prospecting and development” of major extractive resources, and that “[t]he 
right to share in the benefits derived from the development or sale of natural 
resources extends to all peoples of a state.”184 State duties to respect peoples’ 
resource rights thus demand extensive and proactive state action. 
An important issue is how this legal approach bears on corporations and 
other private actors that exploit natural resources. Corporate responsibilities 
to respect peoples’ rights over natural resources form an emerging legal 
regime. The CESCR has affirmed states’ obligations to take steps to prevent 
human rights abuses by corporations based in their jurisdiction, which has 
been echoed in an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.185 
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This set of state obligations is set out most comprehensively in the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, endorsed by the Human 
Rights Council in 2011.186 The Guiding Principles also provide substantial 
detail on corporate responsibilities to respect human rights. The Guiding 
Principles encourage companies to conduct human rights impact 
assessments of their activities and to act with due diligence to avoid 
infringing those rights.187 While the Guiding Principles are not legally 
binding, the HRC has established a working group to draft a corresponding 
binding treaty. This working group is developing ever-more sophisticated 
versions of this treaty.188 A binding treaty would have significant impacts on 
states’ understanding of their duties toward citizens with regard to natural 
resources and the obligations of companies in the extractive industries. 
Moreover, jurisprudence is increasingly emerging from human rights 
institutions on the intersection of human rights obligations, corporations, and 
natural resources. The African Commission has done the most to specify the 
obligations of corporations with regard to the extraction of natural 
resources.189 The Commission sets out a suite of corporate obligations 
corresponding to the rights recognized in the African Charter.190 The first is 
an obligation to do no harm and take due care, which requires mechanisms 
for rectifying negative human rights impacts and for ensuring responsible 
supply chain management.191 The second is an obligation for firms to respect 
all applicable fiscal and transparency obligations, and to inform and consult 
with the peoples affected by their operations.192 Additionally, as noted above, 
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the Commission insists that a people’s right freely to dispose of its natural 
resources is inviolable, and that states have only a delegated role in the 
exercise of this right. Given the Commission’s detailed cataloguing of the 
substantial, procedural, and remedial rights that follow from this inviolable 
right, it appears that the Commission also sees corporations as bound to 
respect these rights of peoples where the rights bear on their conduct, on pain 
of criminal liability.193 
A. Reforms to Lift the Resource Curse 
Peoples’ rights over resources are stated clearly in law and mostly not 
respected in fact. All of the reforms to laws and practices discussed so far 
have concerned the states where natural resources are extracted. Yet much, 
perhaps most, of the progress needed to secure peoples’ rights over their 
resources can be made outside of the countries of extraction. 
Around the world, it is the countries of extraction that are the sites 
where the “inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely 
their natural wealth and resources” are violated.194 However, many of the 
legal reforms needed to counter such violations can be implemented in other 
states, and especially in the major economies of North America, Europe, and 
Asia. These states are the home states of the major extractive corporations, 
and so control the standards by which these corporations interact with state 
officials, indigenous peoples, and armed groups in countries of extraction. 
Moreover, these major economies are also the main importers of natural 
resources and the main sources of resource revenues going into countries of 
extraction. By making it legal for their persons to purchase natural resources 
from corrupt, violent, and oppressive actors in countries of extraction, 
importing states are today contributing to, and indeed sometimes sustaining, 
the continuing violation of the resource rights of peoples. To lift the resource 
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the “low respect of human and peoples’ rights in the extractive industries sector resulting in extensive 
individual and collective human rights violations.” 
 193 On corporate criminal liability, the African Commission quotes the Malabo Protocol of 2014, 
specifically its Article relating to natural resources. African Union, Protocol on Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 28L Bis at 32-33 (June 27, 
2014) https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-amendments-protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-human-
rights. The Malabo Protocol will come into effect when it has 15 state parties; at the time of this writing 
there are 11. According to the Commission, acts triggering corporate criminal liability include concluding 
an agreement to exploit natural resources through corrupt practices, or concluding an agreement that is 
clearly one-sided, or that violates the legal procedures of the state concerned. Also triggering criminal 
liability is, the Commission says, “concluding an agreement to exploit resources, in violation of the 
principles of peoples’ sovereignty over their natural resources.” ACHPR, supra note 17, ¶ 60. 
 194 ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 47; ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 25. 
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curse, this must change. In discussing methods for change, we take up 
corporate home-state regulation and the laws of resource-importing states in 
turn. 
B. Realizing Peoples’ Rights to Their Natural Resources: Home States 
Regulations 
On corporate regulation, it is noteworthy that the major instruments to 
which many corporations and investors have already committed themselves 
require respect for “internationally recognized human rights.” These 
instruments include the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, the UN Global Compact, and the Equator Principles for financial 
institutions.195 Were the substantive, procedural, and remedial rights 
described above to receive more international recognition, this would require 
corporations and investors committed to these instruments to evaluate, for 
example, whether a potential extractive project would break the “wall” of 
peoples’ rights by directing resource revenues to corrupt officials who would 
use the funds for non-public purposes. Respect for peoples’ rights might also 
require corporations to evaluate whether a potential project would exploit the 
resources of the territory beyond any possible accountability to the citizens. 
While many corporations and investors currently screen projects for 
corruption, few evaluate projects on their broader state accountability to 
citizens.196 Evaluating and potentially rejecting potential extractive projects 
on this basis would require significant changes in their business practices. 
Some corporations and investors do want to integrate human rights into 
their operational decisions. However, they also want regulations to be 
enforced equally on their competitors, and (especially in the extractive 
industries, where projects span years or even decades) they need clarity and 
predictability over how regulations will be applied. Stronger affirmation of 
citizens’ human rights over their natural resources—for example, by the 
treaty bodies that oversee the Covenants—would increase pressures from 
business and finance for their home states to standardize the requirements 
for respect of these rights across competing firms, ideally with multilateral 
standardization and enforcement across all firms’ home states. A historical 
parallel from the 1970s is the pressure that the private sector put on states to 
create multilateral standards for export credit agencies. This corporate 
 
 195 Guiding Principles, supra note 187; The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UN GLOBAL 
COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc (last visited Mar. 2, 2021); The Equator 
Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, https://equator-principles.com/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2021). 
 196 Nathan M. Jensen & Edmund J. Malesky, Nonstate Actors and Compliance with International 
Agreements: An Empirical Analysis of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 72 INT’L ORG. 33, 33–69 
(2018). 
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pressure resulted in today’s OECD and WTO regulatory instruments that 
create a “level playing field” for states’ financial support for their firms 
operating abroad.197 
Corporations are legal creations of their home states, and the regulatory 
standards of their home states can have great influence over which and how 
extractive projects proceed abroad. An illustration of the development of 
such home-state standards in a related domain is prohibitions on corporate 
bribery of foreign officials. Until the 1970s, no state regulated their firms’ 
bribery of foreign officials; in some states, such bribes were even tax-
deductible.198 Starting with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 
major states began to pass anti-bribery legislation binding their own 
corporations.199 Coordination of these domestic laws was guided by OECD 
multilateral standards. All OECD member states have now passed anti-
bribery laws, and these laws appear to have reduced bribery compared to 
nonmember states.200 A broader multilateral instrument, the UN Convention 
Against Corruption, came into force in 2005 and now counts 186 state 
parties.201 
Robust affirmation of the rights of citizens over natural resources 
should reinforce this existing anti-corruption regime. Home-state regulation 
of firms against making corrupt deals for natural resources can be 
characterized as protecting the “wall” of human rights that requires the 
disposition of natural resources to be made “in the exclusive interest of the 
people,” instead of in the private interest of officials.202 The addition of this 
human rights argument—based on the principle of self-determination of 
peoples, to which the great preponderance of states are committed—adds 
 
 197 See EXPORT CREDITS, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/export-credits/ (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2021); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WTO, https://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm_01_e.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2021). 
 198 Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 929, 929–1014 
(2012). 
 199 John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an Expanding FCPA, 26 
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 25, 25 (2012). 
 200 On the OECD Convention, see OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/ 
oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2021). On compliance, see Jensen & Malesky, supra 
note 196. 
 201 See United Nations Convention against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003). The OECD 
has been attempting to persuade China in particular to join its more rigorous anti-corruption regime. 
Michael Griffiths, OECD Wooing China to Sign Anti-Bribery Convention, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS 
REV. (Aug. 17, 2018), https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/1173227/oecd-wooing-china-to-
sign-anti-bribery-convention. 
 202 African Charter, supra note 75, art. 21. 
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weight to calls for stronger home-state regulation of corporate corruption 
abroad.203 
Respect for the resource rights of citizens requires firms to evaluate 
more broadly whether a potential project would exploit the territory’s 
resources beyond any possible accountability to the people. As above, the 
procedural rights of citizens include rights to transparency and participation 
regarding the disposition of the territory’s natural resources. For a 
corporation to remove resources from the territory under a non-transparent 
agreement with an unaccountable state or non-state actor would violate these 
procedural rights. Respect for the human right of self-determination thus 
requires firms not to make resource deals with authoritarian regimes or 
armed groups. Taking the propertarian language of the international 
instruments seriously, firms should not make deals for stolen goods—goods 
stolen from the people. 
This conclusion, though seemingly inevitable in theory, immediately 
raises the question of how transparency and accountability could be 
measured with the clarity and certainty that the extractive industries need for 
planning their projects. How could companies evaluate whether any actor is 
transparent and accountable enough to the people to deal with, without fear 
of violating the rights of citizens “to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their 
natural wealth and resources”?204 These might appear to be questions that go 
beyond the competence of businesses to answer individually and to agree on 
collectively. 
The minimal requirements of transparency and accountability to 
citizens are not difficult to frame in the abstract.205 To be able to hold their 
government accountable for its resource management, citizens must have at 
least bare-bones civil liberties and political rights. First, citizens must be able 
to find out what the government is doing with the territory’s resources and 
where the resource revenues are going. Second, citizens must be able to 
discuss and peacefully protest what the government is doing without 
reasonable fear of losing their jobs, freedoms, or lives. Third, if a majority 
 
 203 Whatever the realities of its policies, China is ideologically a “people’s republic,” based on the 
principle of both external and internal self-determination of peoples, as can be seen in the first paragraph 
of the Chinese constitution: “Feudal China was gradually reduced after 1840 to a semi-colonial and semi-
feudal country. The Chinese people waged wave upon wave of heroic struggles for national independence 
and liberation and for democracy and freedom . . . After waging hard, protracted, and tortuous struggles, 
armed and otherwise, the Chinese people of all nationalities led by the Communist Party of China with 
Chairman Mao Zedong as its leader ultimately, in 1949, overthrew the rule of imperialism, feudalism and 
bureaucrat capitalism, won the great victory of the new-democratic revolution and founded the People’s 
Republic of China. Thereupon the Chinese people took state power into their own hands and became 
masters of the country.” CHINA [CONSTITUTION] 1982, Pmbl. 
 204 ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 47; ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 25. 
 205 See Wenar, supra note 13, at 225–30. 
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of citizens strongly disagree with the government’s management of the 
country’s resources, then government policy must change to reflect this 
within a reasonable time. 
These standards are not impossibly high; not every oil-exporter needs 
to be Norway to be above this rather low baseline. Moreover, there are 
respected independent metrics that evaluate all states on whether they are 
“above the line” on the relevant rights and liberties.206 Possible biases in these 
metrics can be balanced out by combining them into a “‘metrics of metrics,” 
which have already been developed.207 Using such a combined metric to 
evaluate which states are at least minimally accountable to citizens finds that 
states like Nigeria and Kuwait are “above the line” of public accountability, 
while autocracies and failed states like Turkmenistan and South Sudan are 
below it.208 Perhaps surprisingly, the clarity and predictability required for 
evaluating respect for citizens’ procedural rights over their natural resources 
are attainable. 
Nevertheless, it might strain credulity to believe that extractive 
corporations and investors will by themselves coordinate sufficiently to 
pressure their home states to impose common standards to respect this aspect 
of peoples’ resource rights. After all, these standards would restrict the set 
of states in which these companies could do business. Much of the initiative 
to set such standards would need to come from states themselves. States must 
come to understand that their obligation to respect the self-determination of 
peoples, which most states have historically committed to uphold, requires 
significant changes in their domestic law. This is precisely why the human 
rights-based approach to citizens’ rights to natural resources is so important 
to these debates on transparency and accountability. It adds the legal and 
moral elements that have been missing so far in international discussions of 
these issues. 
 
 206 Transparency and accountability are measured, for example, by sub-indices of the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Index, by the indices published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom 
House, Transparency International, and others. See Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK, https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ (last visited Mar. 6, 
2021); Democracy Index 2020, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-
index (last visited Mar. 6, 2021); Freedom House, supra note 1; Transparency International, supra note 
2. 
 207 See Wenar, supra note 13, at 284–87; CLEAN TRADE, http://www.cleantrade.org/investors (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2021) (explaining the Clean Trade Governance Index). 
 208 Id. 
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C. Realizing Peoples’ Rights to their Natural Resources: Importing State 
Laws 
The legal changes required for states to respect peoples’ resource rights 
go beyond the regulation of their own corporations. The deepest domestic 
reform required for the self-determination of peoples concerns the legality 
of resource imports. States that import natural resources have sovereign 
authority over where it will be legal for their persons to source those 
resources. How states decide to exercise this sovereign authority can be 
decisive for whether peoples’ rights over their resources will be respected or 
violated in the countries of extraction, as can be seen by reviewing the 
dynamics of today’s resource curse. 
Natural resources such as petroleum, metals, and gems are concentrated 
sources of economic value that can be extracted from relatively small and 
easily-secured sites. Under today’s legal regime, the default rule of all states 
is for it to be legal for their persons to purchase resources from whatever 
state (and sometimes non-state) actor controls the territory where the 
extraction site is located.209 This means that whoever controls resource-rich 
territory can receive substantial (and sometimes immense) revenues from 
selling the resources of that territory to foreigners. In essence, whoever can 
keep coercive control over some holes in the ground can get rich.210 
In many resource-rich countries, a regime that can keep control over oil 
wells or mineral mines can get the funds it needs for the coercion or 
clientelism that will keep it in power. Examples include the governments of 
Azerbaijan (oil) and Zimbabwe (diamonds).211 For non-state actors, an armed 
group that can seize extraction sites can get the funds it needs to start or 
escalate a civil conflict. Examples have been ISIS (oil) and the militants in 
the eastern Congo (metals).212 For both state and non-state actors, what is 
notable about the power they gain from resource revenues is that this power 
comes with no accountability. Unlike foreign loans from banks, resource 
revenues need never be paid back. Unlike aid from foreign allies, resource 
revenues arrive with no conditions attached. Most significantly, resource 
revenues flow to state and non-state actors beyond accountability to the 
 
 209 For example, when Saddam Hussain’s junta took over Iraq in a coup in 1968, it became legal for 
the persons of all states to buy Iraq’s oil from that junta. When ISIS took over some of those same wells 
in 2014, it became legal to buy Iraq’s oil from ISIS. (Some importing states then imposed sanctions on 
ISIS, which made it illegal for their persons to buy oil from ISIS.) Wenar, supra note 25. 
 210 Id. 
 211 For examples of recent reporting on governance in Azerbaijan and Zimbabwe, see Radio Free 
Europe, Critics Say Azeri Petrodollars Mask Poverty and Oppression (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-critics/29870317.html; Zimbabwe, GLOBAL WITNESS, 
https://www.globalwitness.org/tagged/zimbabwe/ (last visited May 10, 2021). 
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people. Resource-empowered actors typically do not need a healthy, 
educated, or politically engaged population to gain the revenues that keep 
them in power. Indeed, resource revenues can even continue to flow during 
widespread civil conflict, as in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi.213 
Under the current transnational legal regime, large resource revenues 
go to state and non-state actors who are entirely unaccountable to their 
citizens for the management of those resources. In many countries, these 
revenues enable these actors to abuse and neglect citizens, often while 
enriching themselves. This helps explain the correlations with which we 
began: today, most authoritarian regimes, highly corrupt regimes, civil wars, 
and hunger crises are in resource-rich states; most refugees have been fleeing 
from these states, and ever-more of the world’s extreme poverty is located 
in these states.214 In many resource-rich states, citizens can only watch as the 
natural resources of their country are extracted and sold off by actors who 
will use the revenues further to oppress, attack, or impoverish them. This is 
the resource curse. 
The revenues that empower unaccountable actors in resource-exporting 
states come from resource-importing states. Yet this need not remain so; 
every sovereign state has the right to determine from whom it will be legal 
for its persons to buy resources.215 It is within the legal authority of sovereign 
states to stop resource revenues from flowing from them to state and non-
state actors who are not minimally accountable to citizens for exports. There 
will be practical considerations for individual states that want to stop such 
flows, such as energy security and diplomatic relations with traditional allies. 
Yet the legal authority itself is not in question. 
It might be asked why states would consider exercising this authority.216 
A different perspective asks how they could justify not doing so. Recall the 
repeated affirmation of the people’s resource rights in the Covenants: 
 
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth 
and resources . . . In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence. Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as 
 
 213 Irene Costantini, Conflict Dynamics in Post-2011 Libya, 5 CONFLICT SEC. & DEV. 405 (2016). 
 214 See supra, notes 2–6. 
 215 In 2011, for instance, the United States made it illegal for its persons to buy petroleum from the 
Libyan government; and in 2016 it prohibited transactions with the senior oil official of ISIS. Exec. Order 
No. 13566, 31 C.F.R. §570 Appendix A (July 1, 2011); Treasury Sanctions Key ISIL Leaders and 
Facilitators Including a Senior Oil Official, US DEPT. TREASURY (Feb. 11, 2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0351.aspx. 
 216 The economic and diplomatic feasibility of states in North America and Europe tapering off oil 
imports from exporters that lack minimal accountability to citizens is discussed in LEIF WENAR ET AL., 
BEYOND BLOOD OIL: PHILOSOPHY, POLICY, AND THE FUTURE 18–23 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishing 
Grp. Inc. 2018). 
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impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and 
freely their natural wealth and resources.217 
 
Both articles of the Covenants use propertarian language: the resources 
of a country are the people’s resources. As we have seen, this has been 
interpreted as meaning that the resources are the people’s “birthright.” At 
independence, the resources start out in the people’s hands, although they 
may thereafter be privatized. Many national constitutions and laws use 
similar propertarian language. If this language is accepted literally, then 
anyone selling off a territory’s public resources without any possible 
accountability to the owners of those resources, the citizens, is selling stolen 
goods. Importing states that use their authority to stop their nationals from 
buying resources from unaccountable resource vendors would be prohibiting 
their nationals from buying stolen goods. These importing states would be 
enforcing the property rights of peoples to their natural resources. Importing 
states that reform their domestic law to prohibit their persons from buying 
resources from unaccountable foreign actors would thus be correcting a flaw 
in today’s global markets: a flaw that allows resources to be bought legally 
from actors unaccountable to the owners of those resources. Reforming 
importing states would be transforming a black market in stolen goods into 
a genuine market where stolen goods cannot be purchased under color of 
title. Brazil’s Senate is now considering legislation, phrased in exactly these 
terms, that would reform its law in just this way.218 
Finally, beyond these two types of reforms, stronger affirmation of 
peoples’ resource rights may impact other areas of transnational law such as 
investor-state relations. To see possible impacts on investor-state relations, 
a parallel may be drawn to recent rulings regarding corruption.219 Some 
international investment tribunals have held that investor-state contracts that 
were obtained by corruption are either invalid or unenforceable. It has been 
 
 217 See ICCPR, supra note 19; ICESCR, supra note 19. 
 218 Senado Federal de Brasil, Projeto de Lei do Senado [Federal Senate of Brazil, Senate Bill] no. 
460, de 2017. This legislation would prohibit Brazilian companies from importing oil from states that 
violate the principle of popular sovereignty over natural resources and would prohibit Brazil’s national 
oil company from entering into new contracts with the governments of such states. The legislation is 
pending as of the time of this writing, March 2021. 
 219 See Sophie Nappert, Nailing Corruption: Thoughts for a Gardener, in THE PRACTICE OF 
ARBITRATION 161 (P. Wautelet, T. Kruger, & G. Coppens eds., 2012); Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler & 
Dorothée Gottwald, Corruption, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 586 
(Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008); Clara Reiner & Christoph 
Schreuer, Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 82 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, & Francesco 
Francioni, eds., 2009); Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights? 60 
INT’L COMP. L. Q. 573 (2011). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
78 
held that the anti-corruption norms affirmed in several international 
instruments are a matter of international public policy, and so tribunals are 
obliged to comply with these norms in their decisions.220 In one much-
discussed decision, a tribunal found that an investor could not enforce a 
contract because the state official that it had bribed to win the contract was 
acting beyond his legitimate state functions, so that his actions could not be 
imputed to the state itself.221 As two distinguished scholars have summarized 
this line of reasoning, “corruption inducing an investment transaction 
invalidates it, and . . . in such cases the loss lies where it falls.”222 
Were citizens’ resource rights to become more consistently recognized, 
the result would be a state appealing to a tribunal against the enforcement of 
a contract for natural resource exploitation made between an investor and a 
predecessor authoritarian regime. The state would allege that there was 
“reasonable certainty” or “clear and convincing evidence” that the contract 
had been concluded without the possible participation either of the relevant 
indigenous peoples or of the citizens of the state.223 The contract, the claimant 
state would argue, thus contradicts international public policy. A consistent 
line of decisions by tribunals accepting this argument would increase respect 
for peoples’ resource rights and further the security of future investor-state 
agreements.224 The idea that corruption could lead tribunals to annul 
investment contracts seemed merely theoretical a few years ago; as the 
previous paragraph shows, this is now established practice. The law is now 
waiting for lawyers to take parallel actions on citizens’ resource rights that 
will turn legal theory into legal reality. 
CONCLUSION 
After their long historical development, the rights of peoples over their 
natural resources are now ready for decisive international affirmation and 
enforcement. The sooner this recognition is given, the better. Natural 
resources are crucial for the cultural integrity and the survival of indigenous 
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peoples. Natural resources are also essential to secure the subsistence and the 
economic health of national populations. Without sufficient accountability, 
peoples can find that the revenues from their territory’s resources are being 
spent without benefit to them or, in many cases, are even being used against 
them. The shockingly high prevalence of authoritarianism, corruption, 
poverty, and civil conflict in contemporary resource-rich states demonstrates 
the dangers of a lack of public accountability. Respect for the rights of 
peoples over their natural resources is essential for the resources of all states 
to become a blessing instead of a curse. 
